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RELAXATION OF IMPLEMENTATION PLANS
UNDER THE 1977 CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENTS
.David P. Currie*

INTRODUCTION

Though the Clean Air Act gives the Environmental Protection
Agency considerable powers to regulate both mobile and stationary
air-pollution sources directly, 1 everyday control of most existing stationary sources remains subject to an awkward joint federal-state
program based on ambient air-quality standards.2 The core of this
program is section 109, under which the EPA promulgates primary
air-quality standards "requisite to protect the public health" and secondary standards "requisite to protect the public welfare from any
known or anticipated adverse effects."3 Under section 110, the states
then submit plans to the EPA for "attainment and maintenance" of
the primary standards within three years and of the secondary standards within "a reasonable time."4
The most striking feature of this scheme is its absoluteness: Sec* Hany N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Chairman, Illinois Pollution
Control Board, 1970-1972. A.B. 1957, University of Chicago; LL.B. 1960, Harvard University.-Ed. My thanks to Mark Reinhardt, J.D. 1978, Chicago, and to Scott Bieber, J.D. 1979,
Chicago, for thoughtful papers that helped shape my thinking on this subject. This Article is
part of a forthcoming book on the Clean Air Act as a whole.
l. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412, 7521, 7603 (Supp. I 1977). See Currie, The Mobile-Source
Provisions of the Clean Air Act, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 811 (1979); Currie, J)irect Federal Regulation ofStationary Sources Under the Clean Air Act, - U. PA. L. REV.- (1980) (forthcoming).
Congressional efforts to clean the air have a longer history than one might suspect. The first
significant piece oflegislation on the subject was the Clean Air Act of 1955, Pub. L. 84-159, ch.
360, 69 Stat. 322, July 14, 1955 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858). After periodic
revisions, Congress overhauled the Act with the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91604, 84 Stat. 1676, Dec. 31, 1970 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858) [hereinafter
cited as Clean Air Amendments of 1970]. In 1977, Congress revamped the Act again. Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat.-685, Aug. 7, 1977 (recodified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (Supp. I 1977)) [hereinafter cited as Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977]. As its
name implies, this Article scrutinizes these latest congressional efforts.
2. For a detailed exploration of the relevant provisions as they stood before the 1977
amendments, see Currie, Federal Air-Quality Standards and Their Implementation, 1976 A.B.F.
RES. J. 365.
3. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 109, as amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. I 1977).
4. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 110, as amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. I 1977).
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tions 109 and 110 flatly command that all adverse effects of air pollution be eliminated without regard to cost, and the Senate Committee
in 1970 coldly confirmed this conclusion: "[E]xisting sources of pollutants either should meet the standard of the law or be closed
down. . . ."5 The Supreme Court in dictum agreed: "Section
110(a)(2)(A)'s three-year deadline for achieving primary air quality
standards . . . leaves no room for claims of technological or economic feasibility." 6
The harshness of the statutory requirements was dramatized by
their implications for Los Angeles, which in the warmer months
would have had to reduce vehicle travel by eighty-two percent to
meet the primary ambient standard for photochemical oxidants by
the statutory deadline of 1975.7 Without minimi7.ing the desirability
of eliminating Los Angeles smog, 8 one might wonder whether it
would be worth the cost of shutting the city down.
Nevertheless, following the plain command of section
110(a)(2)(A), the EPA promulgated gasoline-rationing regulations
for Califomia, and the Ninth Circuit duly upheld them: "[H]aving
recognized that no alternative exists which is capable of attaining the
requisite standards, petitioners have implicitly accepted the necessity
of this regulation."9 Yet the EPA responded to its victory by revoking the rationing requirement, reasoning that its enforcement would
have "extremely adverse social and economic consequences" and
noting that both houses of Congress, by passing separate bills that if
enacted would have afforded relief, had "affirmatively expressed
their desire" that Los Angeles be spared. At the same time, the EPA
steadfastly maintained that it would not generally accept cost as an
excuse for ignoring the clear statutory command; this was a "special
case." 10
The Los Angeles accommodation underscored the failure of
Congress to make adequate provision for ameliorating even the most
ruinous costs of achieving rigid air quality standards. Of necessity,
legislators write statutes to fit typical cases, and pollution statutes
commonly contain an escape valve that authorizes variances when
5. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
6. Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 2S8 (1976),
1. See 38 Fed. Reg. 2194-2200 (1973).
8. See U.S. DEPT, OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR
PHOTOCHEMICAL OXIDANTSpassim (NAPCA Pub. No. AP-63 (1970)).
9. City of Santa Rosa v. Environmental Protection Agency, 534 F.2d 150, 154 (9th Cir.
1976).
10. See 41 Fed. Reg. 45565 (1976). See also 1 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 920 (1976).
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compliance would impose unreasonable hardship. 11 Congress, however, did not follow this maxim in drafting the Clean Air Act. Although the 1970 Amendments contained two provisions allowing
limited extensions of the deadlines relating to air-quality standards,
both fell far short of protecting dischargers from being forced to take
economically unreasonable action. Under section ll0(e), 12 which
the 1977 Amendments left intact, the EPA Administrator may extend the date for compliance with a primary standard for not more
than two years; under former section ll0(f), 13 which was repealed in
1977, he could postpone the applicability of an implementation-plan
requirement to an individual source for not more than one year. In
neither case, however, had the affected polluter any right to invoke
the remedy:. The governor had to make the request, and politics
might preclude his doing so in a deserving case. Moreover, neither
provision clearly made unreasonable cost a basis for relief: The Administrator had to be convinced that the necessary technology was
"not available" in time to meet the standard and, in the case of section ll0(f), that continued operation of the polluting source was "essential to national security or to the public health or welfare." 14
Although Los Angeles received an extension to 1977 under section
110(e), the consensus has been that it was not renewable; yet compliance was just as unthinkable in 1977 as in 1975. 15
Courts and administrators, however, generally find ways around
unreasonable statutory requirements, and the Clean Air Act was no
exception. In the case of Los Angeles, for instance, the EPA simply
cast aside the troublesome rationing provisions, section 1lO's commands notwithstanding. 16 Other sections of the Act, however, may
have offered more defensible escape hatches. Section 113, in providing that the Administrator "may" issue an enforcement order to seek
11. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Act § 35, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1035
(1973).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(e) (Supp. I 1977).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e)(l) & (f)(l) (1976) (repealed 1977).
14. For discussion of these provisions, see Currie, supra note 2, at 380-85.
15. State variances offered no means of escape for Los Angeles. After considerable litigation, the Supreme Court foreclosed that route in Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
421 U.S. 60 (1975), holding that a state variance could be approved as a plan revision under
§ 1IO(a)(3)(A) only ifit did not interfere with the timely attainment of ambient standards. The
House Committee in 1977 declared its intention "to confirm the correctness of the Supreme
Court's opinion in the Train case." H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 1077, 1135. The Sixth Circuit confirmed that
Train survived the 1977 Amendments in Ohio Env. Council v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 593 F.2d 24, 32-33 (6th Cir. 1979).
16. See text at notes 4-6 supra.
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judicial enforcement, 17 appeared to afford the traditional flexibility
of prosecutorial discretion. 18 Moreover, section 113(a)(4) suggested
another possibility for relief from undue hardship by directing the
Administrator to specify a "reasonable" time for compliance in issuing an enforcement order. 19 Despite an early court decision that
"[s]ection 113 is simply not an appropriate vehicle ... for ... securing a variance,"20 the EPA took advantage of the apparent loophole, and the Supreme Court in Union Electric Co. v. EPA
apparently endorsed that conduct: . "Claims of technological or economic infeasibility, the Administrator agrees, are relevant to fashioning an appropriate compliance order under§ I 13(a)(4):"21
Such, then, was the sorry state of the law before 1977: a requirement that standards be set to achieve absolute freedom from adverse
health effects, with wholly inadequate variance provisions and with
relief provided under the table without either hearings or public participation. Congress responded by enacting the 1977 Amendments,
which allow temporary relief from the Draconian deadlines of the
1970 Act, but still do not acknowledge the unpleasant possibility that
total elimination of pollution's harmful effects may even in the long
run not be worth the cost.
This Article probes the convoluted ameliorative provisions of the
1977 Amendments in three parts. Section I deals with delayed compliance orders - orders granted to stationary sources unable to meet
the statutory deadlines for compliance. Section 113(d) is the fountainhead provision, and besides a general provision for delayed compliance, it also contains specific provisions for sources unable to
comply due to retirement of present facilities, due to investment in
innovative facilities with the promise of greater pollution reduction
in the future or due to government orders to convert from cleaner
fuels to coal.
Section II analyzes two specific relief provisions intended to go
17. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, supra note I,§ 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1976).
18. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1002, 1003-05 (N.D.
Ala. 1976). Cf. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 659-60 (3d Cir. 1976) (describing
the EPA's practice under the 1972 version of the Water Pollution Control Act of issuing "Enforcement Compliance Schedule Letters" that fixed compliance deadlines, as a matter of
"prosecutorial discretion," at a date later than that prescribed in the statute).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1957c-8(a)(4) (1976).
20. Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (D. Del,
1972). On appeal, the Third Circuit held there was no jurisdiction to consider the issue because in effect the plaintiff was challenging the validity of the implementation plan contrary to
§ 307(b). Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). For criticism of this holding see Currie, Judicial Review Under
Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1221, 1254-58 (1977).
21. Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 268 (1976).
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beyond section 113(d). It first examines section 119, essentially a
special delayed compliance order applicable only to nonferrous
smelters. It then reviews the provisions in section 110 that grant
temporary relief for energy and economic emergencies.
Section III examines the nonattainment provisions, which tackle
the problem most graphically posed by Los Angeles: how to achieve
and maintain ambient standards in areas suffering from excessive
pollution, without bringing both new development and the economy
to a standstill.
I.

DELAYED COMPLIANCE ORDERS

As congressional committees convened in 1977 to reconsider the
provisions of the 1970 Clean Air Act, they acknowledged that some
accommodation had to be made for the estimated 3500 major
sources that had not met section 110 deadlines22 and that the old
variance provision of section I IO(f) was "too restrictive." 23 On the
other hand, the Senate Committee found "no basis in law" for the
EPA's practice of issuing orders for delayed compliance under section 113(a)(4),24 and neither committee thought that practice satisfactory on the merits. The House Committee complained that
section 113 placed no limits on the length oftime the Administrator
might deem "unreasonable," did not require state approval for the
delay, and provided no opportunity for public participation.25 The
Senate Committee added that delayed compliance orders under the
old section 113 left a discharger "subject to citizen suits and to potential inconsistent enforcement action taken by the Administrator."26
The remedy was a new section 113(d), embodying a bewildering
battery of prescriptions. The provision explicitly recognized delayed
compliance orders for the first time:
A State (or, after thirty days notice to the State, the Administrator)
may issue to any stationary source which is unable to comply with any
requirement of an applicable implementation plan an order which
specifies a date for final compliance with such requirement later than
the date for attainment of any national ambient air quality standard
specified in such plan if 22. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1977).
23. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1134.
24. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1977).
25. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1134.
26. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1977).
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(D) the order provides for final compliance . . . as expeditiously as
practicable but ... in no event later than July 1, 1979, or three years
after the date for final compliance with such requirement specified in
such plan, whichever is later . . . .27

A delayed-compliance order (DCO) under the new section may be
issued only after "notice to the public . . . and opportunity for public hearing" and must contain "a schedule and timetable for compliance"28 as well as interim requirements for monitoring, reporting,
and control, including measures to avoid "imminent and substantial
endangerment to health of persons."29 An order must warn any
"major source" that a "noncompliance penalty" will be assessed if
the new deadline is not met.30 Although the Administrator may issue a DCO without state consent, state and local authorities are free
to demand "more expeditious ... compliance."31 On the other
hand, no state may grant a DCO to a "major" source unless the Administrator affirmatively finds that the order was issued "in accordance with the requirements" of the Act, and he may veto any other
state order ifhe determines that it was not so issued. 32 If the Administrator "so objects," he "shall simultaneously proceed to issue'' an
enforcement order.33
The new section also revamped enforcement mechanisms to accommodate the new DCO's: An order issued under section 113(d) is
a defense to any federal or private effort to compel earlier compliance.34 A state-issued order, but not a federal one, becomes "a part
of the applicable implementation plan."35 Should a discharger violate a DCO, the Administrator "shall" enforce the offended requirement by suit or order, revoke the order after a record hearing, or sue
for a noncompliance penalty, evidently without regard to duplication of any state enforcement efforts.36
27. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § I 13(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (Supp. I 1977).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(7)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l)(E) (Supp. I 1977). Noncompliance penalties are set forth in
42 U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. I 1977).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977). The EPA evidently interprets this direction to
apply only to its actual veto of state orders for nonmajor sources, declaring that when it disapproves a major-source order it may either issue an order of its own or go directly to court. See
EPA Environmental Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section I 13(a), (d) Orders, 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 715, 718 (1978).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(IO) (Supp. I 1977).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(I I) (Supp. I 1977).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(9) (Supp. I 1977). A grandfather clause preserves orders
under the old § I 13 to the extent consistent with the new law, and singles out for approval
otherwise excessively long extensions previously granted to Louisville Gas & Electric Co., in
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The new provision responds to the deficiencies of prior law identified by the committee reports. It is less restrictive than the old section ll0(f)-it eliminates the necessity for a governor's request and
it abandons the requirement that continued operation be "essential."
Yet unlike the old section 113, it establishes time limits, it brings
states prominently into the process, and it guarantees public participation through hearings. Furthermore, the section shields a source
receiving an extension against collateral citizen and federal enforcement actions. Yet section 113(d) bristles with difficulties of its own,
both of interpretation and of policy. I shall discuss them in the following sequence: (A) standards for DCO eligibility, (B) time limits,
(C) degree of discretion, (D) hearing requirements, and (E) special
provisions for retirement, innovation and coal conversion.
A.

The Standards for Eligibility

Section 113(d) is remarkably uninformative about the requisites
for allowing delayed compliance. In authorizing relief for any stationary source that is "unable to comply" with an implementationplan requirement, the statute fails to give clear answers to three obvious questions: whether one qualifies for an extension if his present
inability to comply is the result of his own inexcusable conduct;
whether a source is entitled to an extension if the means for compliance are available, but only at unreasonable cost; and whether inability to comply justifies an extension that would perpetuate an
unreasonable health hazard.
l.

Good Faith

On its face the requirement that a source be "unable to comply"
imposes no requirement of good faith in past efforts to achieve
timely compliance; the sole criterion seems to be present inability to
meet the deadline. The EPA has accordingly held good faith irrelevant: A source is eligible for a DCO "regardless of its past history"
so long as it is unable to comply.37 Three arguments underpin the
Agency's interpretation. First, the explicit good-faith requirement of
appreciation of its willingness to help "demonstrate flue gas desulfurization technology." 42
U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l2)(A)(B) (Supp. I 1977). See 123 CONG. REc. H8664 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1977) (clarifying statement), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1570, 1574.
See also H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1502, 1514.
37. See EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section l 13(a), (d), Orders, supra note 33, at 718-19.
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the old section l lO(f),38 the predecessor provision, is conspicuously
absent from section 113(d).39 Second, the silence of section 113
stands in stark contrast to section 120's provision excluding noncompliance penalties when the "inability to· comply" "results from reasons entirely beyond the control of the owner or operator."40 When
read together, the two sections suggest that DCO's may be issued to
sources unable to comply due to inadequate past efforts. Finally, the
Senate Committee specifically rejected a test of prior good faith because it felt the requirement "would place an excessive burden on
the manpower and resources of the States and BPA." 41 All these
considerations will probably lead courts to defer to the EPA's reasonable conclusion that good faith is not required.42
Unfortunately, the absence of a good-faith requirement in sec38. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § l lO(f) (amended 1977) (current version at 42 U.S,C,
§ 1710 (Supp. I 1977)).
39. See generally H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977), reprinted in (1977)
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1134.
40. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, sec. 118, § 120(a)(2)(B)(iv), at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7420(a)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. I 1977).
41. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1977).
42. The issue is not, however, entirely certain. When it first adopted § I 13(d), Congress
accepted "the Senate provision on issuance of enforcement orders," H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1502, 1514. The
Senate version, however, contained no reference to the requirement of inability to comply.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, supra note I,§ 112; see S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., Isl
Sess. 46 (1977). A later "technical" amendment inserted the present "unable to comply" language from the House bill in order to remedy an "erroneous omission" from the original provision. Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-190, § 14(14), 91 Stat. 1393,
1400 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(I) (Supp. I 1977)). See a/so 123 CONG. REC. HI 1,954,
HI 1,957 (daily ed. Nov. I, 1977). The House Committee had given four specific examples of
circumstances that would render a source "unable to comply": (I) means of compliance with
the plan had not been "adequately demonstrated"; (2) means of compliance were unobtainable
due to "shortage"; (3) compliance was prevented by "delay of replacement facilities"; or (4)
compliance was not possible due to "such entirely uncontrollable events as embargoes, strikes,
or natural disasters," H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60 (1977), reprinted in (1977)
U.S. CODE & Ao. NEWS 1077, I 137-38. Except for delay attributable to a replacement facility,
these examples are all of factors over which the discharger is most unlikely to have any control. This pattern suggests that the Committee intended the delay of a replacement to be an
excuse only ifit was not due to the discharger's fault, and indeed that was the requirement of
the earlier bill, H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 103(c)(l){D) (1975), from which the example was taken without indication of disagreement with its particulars. Thus, although the
Committee did not intend the list to be exclusive, the illustrations do suggest that the Committee intended "inability to comply" to mean inability for reasons the discharger could not help,
and therefore to sanction only extensions dependent on good faith.
Thus, Congress first adopted the Senate's language, which excluded good faith; then it
adopted the House's language, which on its face confirms the Senate's intention, but which the
House apparently intended to require good faith. However, since Congress adopted the House
language without suggesting any awareness that it favored the House interpretation over the
Senate's interpretation, since the Conference Committee had said it was adopting the Senate
version, since the Committee was the more explicit in expressly rejecting a requirement of
good faith, and since the Senate interpretation is the more natural reading of the final statutory
language, I conclude that the statute does not require good faith.
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tion 113(d) may reward foot-dragging and place those who did comply with the onerous 1970 requirements at an unjust competitive
disadvantage. Without a DCO, the polluter whose delay is the result
of inadequate efforts could be socked with continuing penalties until
he complied; but section ll0(d)(l) expressly forbids any federal enforcement proceeding "based upon noncompliance during the period
the order is in effect."43 Under section 120, a major source sometimes will have to pay a "noncompliance penalty" adequate to offset
''the economic value" of unjustified delay beyond July I, 1979,
notwithstanding the existence of a DCO.44 But it seems unaccountable that Congress has allowed the miscreant to be spared penalties
from the date of a DCO until mid-1979, or, in some cases, for a
period thereafter. 45
2.

Unreasonable Cost

Pollution statutes typically accommodate economic as well as
physical hardship; the apparent failure to do so, I have argued, was a
major shortcoming of the pre-1977 variance provisions of section
110.46 For example, a brief extension for economic hardship could
avoid expenditures for overtime labor or expedited delivery that
might be exorbitant; a longer one could permit perfection of an economical alternative to prohibitively expensive existing technology,
such as distillation of wastewater.47
Whether section 113(d)(l)'s "unable to comply" standard embraces economic hardship is unclear. A neighboring provision, section 113(d)(4)(0), uses the term "impracticable,"48 which more
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(10) (Supp. I 1977). It does not forbid the infliction of penalties for
violations committed before issuance of the order. Moreover, although final compliance with
many emission requirements was not necessary before 1975 (and possibly not before 1977 in
regions in which ambient deadlines were extended under§ l lO(e)), penalties for violation of
interim requirements such as purchasing equipment might accrue much earlier. However, the
statute made provision for civil penalties only in 1977, see§ l 13(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (Supp.
I 1977), and they can hardly be made retroactive. Moreover, criminal sanctions seem to have
proved ineffective. See S. REP. No. 127 (1977), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1977): "[F)ew criminal actions have been brought and great difficulties and delays have been encountered in these

cases."
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. I 1977). For example, penalties begin to run no later than the
date of adoption of a post-1977 standard, while a DCO may allow three years from the date on
which compliance is prescribed. Compare§ 7420(g) with§ 7413(d)(l)(D).
45. For example, if a standard adopted after mid-1977 allows less than three years for
compliance, any DCO period within those three years appears to be free from penalties. 42
U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. I 1977).
46. See text at notes 1-21 supra.
47. See In re Effluent Criteria, 3 Ill. P.C.B. 401, 413 (1972), where a state board found
distillation technologically available for removing chlorides and sulfates but declined to require it on grounds of cost.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4)(D) (Supp. I 1977).
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clearly includes considerations of cost, and the juxtaposition might
suggest that Congress intended the distinction. Moreover, none of
the examples of "inability" cited in the House Committee Report
involved problems of cost;49 and the Senate Committee, commenting
on a bill that only prescribed compliance as soon as "practicable,"
nonetheless stated that delay could not be allowed "simply for convenience or for economic advantages which would accrue from
delayed compliance."50
On the other hand, the requirement that compliance under a
DCO be achieved as expeditiously as "practicable"51 demonstrates
that cost was to be a factor at least in determining the duration of an
extension. It is hard to believe Congress meant to find the same consideration irrelevant in determining whether the extension should be
- granted at all. The word "unable" does not necessarily exclude cost
considerations: While one is always physically able to comply by
closing a factory, no one would argue that is what Congress had in
mind. 52 As for the legislative history, prohibitive or unreasonable
cost may not be what the Senate Committee meant in rejecting "economic advantages," which sounds like a reference to ordinary profits. More significantly, the House Committee, commenting on the
language found in the present statute, explicitly stated that both
"economic and technical feasibility may be considered, under the
conditions expressly provided for in the statute, including under a
DCO application."53 Finally, the apparent absence of a good-faith
requirement lends further support to the conclusion that cost may be
considered: It seems unlikely that Congress perversely intended to
grant relief to dischargers whose physical inability is their own fault
but not to those facing unreasonable expenses beyond their control.
The EPA and the courts should therefore construe "unable to comply" to include inability due to exorbitant costs, in accordance with
the traditional and sensible variance criterion of unreasonable hard49. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-60 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CooE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1137-38.
50. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1977).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l)(D) (Supp. I 1977).
52. Courts have used analogous reasoning in assessing cost considerations in other federal
regulatory statutes. In the context of occupational health and safety, the D.C. Circuit has
construed the term "feasible" -which is quite close to§ I 13(d)'s "unable to comply" standard
- to allow consideration of cost: "[I]t would comport with common usage to say that a standard that is prohibitively expensive is not 'feasible,'" Industrial Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 499
F.2d 467, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (construing § 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976)).
53. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1146.
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ship. By inserting a single phrase, however, Congress could have
spared us any doubts.
3.

The Extent of the Health Hazard

As I have previously noted, the typical variance criterion is "unreasonable hardship," which allows a comparison of the costs and
benefits of compliance. 54 Section 113(d), however, makes no reference to the benefits of compliance - anyone may receive an extension if ''unable to comply." Yet one can certainly envision situations
where a source that cannot otherwise comply should be shut down.
For example, a source's emissions may be causing widespread disease or ruining a profitable nearby business, while the benefits of its
operation are minimal. While the statute proscribes a DCO for any
"imminent and substantial endangerment to health," it does not
foreclose issuance of a DCO in other cases of unreasonable harm.
Congress should have made clear that no variance may be permitted
unless the cost of immediate compliance significantly outweighs the
benefits.

B. The Time Limit
An order under section 113(d) must call for compliance "as expeditiously as practicable." Thus, the statute quite sensibly allows the
extent of hardship to determine the duration of relief. However, the
section places specific limits on the length of time practicability may
demand. The Senate bill contained a flat 1979 deadline; the House
bill would have limited the "aggregate" of extensions to five years
beyond "the date on which, but for this section . . . compliance
would have been required." 55 The provision adopted out of the Conference Committee incorporates elements of both bills. Except for
certain speci~l orders that I shall discuss below, compliance must
come "in no event later than July 1, 1979, or three years after the
date for final compliance with such requirement specified in such
plan, whichever is later."56
At first glance this language, unlike that of the Senate and House
bills, does not appear to impose an absolute deadline, for arguably
the new date set in the section 113 order is itself a "requirement specified in [the] plan," from which a further extension may be granted.
Section 113(d)(ll) superficially appears to confirm this possibility:
54. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1035 (1973).
55. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 370 (1977); see S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 166 (1977).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l)(d) (Supp. I 1977).
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"any order issued by the State and in effect pursuant to this subsection shall become part of the applicable state plan."57 It does so,
however, only "for the purposes of sections 110, 304, and 307," not
for purposes of section 113(d) itself. This provision, which existed in
the Senate bill, 58 seems to have been designed to assure citizen enforcement and judicial review of delayed-compliance orders, not to
sanction repeated extensions. The Conference Committee indicated
its adherence to the absolute deadlines of both bills: "Orders are
limited to not more than 3 years delay . . . ."59 Finally, as the
Supreme Court said in Union Electric, the function of a conference
committee is to reconcile differences between House and Senate
bills, not to depart from their common provisions.60 Hence the date
specified in an earlier section 113(d) order is not one "specified in
[the] plan" within the meaning of that section, and therefore such an
order may not be renewed. 61
Having concluded that the time limitation is absolute, I think it
misguided. The House Committee gave a number of reasons for it:
The importance of protecting health, the risk of abuse of administrative discretion, the desirability of an incentive for developing technology, and the belief that "5 years would be the maximum . . .
extension ... needed in most instances." 62 Even disregarding the
provision's failure to afford a full five years to any source facing a
deadline in 1975 or later, how can one be confident that five years
will suffice for each of the more than 3500 noncomplying sources,
without exploring their varying circumstances and without clairvoyance about what new impediments will arise during the next five
years? The purpose of any variance provision is to accommodate
cases not fitting the general pattern; it should not itself be procrustean. Health is of course important, but section 113(d) recognizes
that countervailing considerations may predominate before 1979; I
see no reason to think they might not do so in some cases thereafter.
"Technology-forcing" is fine, but the discharger may be in no posi57. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l I) (Supp. I 1977).
58. See S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1977).
59. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1502, 1514.
60. See Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 262-63 (1976).
61. The three-year provision could be invoked to provide a post-1979 date if the plan itself
(as revised, for example, or to implement a new air-quality standard) provided for compliance
after July I, 1976. See also EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section
113(a), (d) Orders, supra note 33, at 720 & n.• (§ II0(e) extension and plan readopted after
invalidation by court).
62. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1142-43.
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tion to develop the necessary technology. Conditioning further extension on proof of the discharger's best efforts toward reducing
emissions, or the rejected House provision requiring financial contributions toward the development of controls,63 would have served
Congress's purpose without imposing the potential hardship of an
inflexible schedule. A check on administrative abuse could have
been provided, as in Illinois,64 by authorizing brief and renewable
extensions conditioned on satisfactory progress, subject to legislative
oversight. Instead, the wasteful process of still another congressional
amendment, the remedy contemplated by the House Committee, 65
seems virtually inevitable under section 113(d); it might well have
been avoided if Congress had not been so extraordinarily mistrustful
of the EPA's ability to administer a flexible standard.

C. .Discretion
Section 113(d) provides that an extension "may" be issued to a
source that cannot comply, not that it "shall" be.66 Accordingly, the
Agency has announced in its guidelines that it will not issue extensions to all who qualify. 67 The legislative history confirms this interpretation. Both bills used the term "may." The Senate Report was
silent on the question of discretion, but the House Report was explicit: "This section authorizes, but does not require, the issuance of
a DCO . . . . Thus, a source which has borne the burden of providing [sic] its eligibility for . . . a DCO ... has not created any entitlement thereto." 6 8
One might think that the need to allow relief for unreasonable
hardship is so obvious that Congress should not have left the matter
to the discretion of states and an administrative agency. Part of the
answer lies in the delicate statutory balance of federal-state relations:
a state may refuse to grant an extension because under section 116 it
63. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371-72 (1977).
64. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill 1/2, §§ 1035-1037 (1973).
65. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1143.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (Supp. I 1977).
67. See EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section I 13(a), (d) Orders, supra note 33, at 715-16. The statutory language alone is not conclusive. The Illinois
Pollution Control Board, for example, operating under a variance provision employing the
same word "may," assumed the legislature had meant for those who qualified to be given
relief, and the Illinois courts ordered variances granted when they found the Board's denial
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See Seegren v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 291 N.E.2d 347 (1972).
68. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1145.
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may impose standards more stringent than federal law requires. 69
The House Committee justified giving the federal agency discretion
by arguing that "the Administrator stands in a position of the
State"70 regarding a plan he has adopted and that discretion promotes the development of technology: "If an order were mandated
whenever the conditions . . . were met, sources might be encouraged
to devote their sole or primary effort to perfecting their case for an
order, rather than to the task of research and development to make
available the equipment needed to comply."71
This reasoning is quite unpersuasive. In relevant respects the
Administrator does not stand in the same position as a state; he is the
instrument of congressional policy, not another sovereign with independent responsibility to protect its people. As for technologyforcing, again I think Congress has carried its point too far. Technological advancement can be encouraged by making good-faith efforts
to innovate a prerequisite for an extension, without conferring upon
the Agency discretion to exact compliance despite unreasonable
hardship. Indeed, the diversion of effort from research to litigation
is likely to be just as great when an administrator defines who will be
given a variance as when the statute does.
Nevertheless, the discretion conferred by section 113(d) is a partial antidote to the overly lax threshold requirement of inability to
comply with the plan. The states and the Administrator may limit
extensions to situations where the cost of shutdown exceeds the benefits, or where commitments are made to develop technology, or
where past efforts at compliance have been in good faith. Indeed,
they are free to determine that no extensions will be allowed at all. 72
Exercising this discretion, the EPA has announced that it will not
grant a DCO to any source with "an egregious history of noncompliance, recalcitrance, or environmental harm" and has recommended
that states adopt the same position.73 An earlier EPA statement had
purported to require the states to do so,74 but the Agency abandoned
the attempt in apparent recognition that the statute allows EPA disapproval of state orders only for failure to meet the statutory criteria
69. Id.
10. Id. at 68, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1146.
71. Id. at 67, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1145.
72. The legislative history related in text at note 69 supra certainly supports this last possibility where a state is concerned, and the Administrator seems to possess powers at least equal
to those of a state.
13. See EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section 113(a), (d) Orders, supra note 33, at 716-17.
74. 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1131-32 (1978).
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for eligibility. Instead, the EPA will seek penalties under section
113(b) for pre-DCO violations in cases where it. would not have
granted relief because of a history of recalcitrance.75 As I suggested
earlier, a better solution would have been to allow the EPA to disapprove state orders on a finding of bad faith.
The delegation of discretionary variance authority in section
113(d) certainly improves the prior law, which essentially provided
relief only under the table, and it is undoubtedly better than requiring variances without proof of unreasonable hardship. But I see no
justification for empowering the EPA either to refuse relief to one
who shows such hardship or to grant it to one who does not. Regrettably, section 113(d) seems to give it authority to do both.
D. Hearings
Delayed-compliance orders under the pre-1977 section 113 were
issued not only without public participation, but also without any
right of a hearing for the discharger. To rectify this shortcoming, the
new section l 13(d) requires "notice to the public ... and opportunity for public hearing."76
"Public hearing," a popular rulemaking requirement,77 commonly connotes the kind of hearing conducted by legislative committees.78 That is what the House Report had in mind,79 and that is
how the EPA interprets the requirement. 80 What Congress neglected
to consider is that the decision whether or not to give an individual
source more time is essentially adjudicative, not legislative. The issue may often be whether circumstances peculiar to a source - an
explosion, a delay in delivery, unfavorable soil conditions - render
it "unable to comply." 81 For questions like these, legislatures have
often insisted on trial procedures, including cross-examination and
decision on the basis of the hearing record. 82
75. See EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section 113(a), (d) Orders, supra note 33, at 717.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
77. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 l/2, § 1037 (1973).
78. See generally Currie, The Mobile-Source Provisions of the Clear Air Act, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 811, 837-47 (1979).
79. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1136 ("an informal, legislative-type hearing").
80. See EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section ll3(a), (d) Orders, supra note 33, at 720; 43 Fed. Reg. 44522 (1978) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 65.04).
81. Regulations may make other adjudicative facts relevant, such as past efforts toward
compliance, the degree of hardship a shutdown would cause, and the harm continued emissions from a particular source would do to the community.
82. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 l/2, § 1037 (1973).
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Quasi-judicial procedures would be well-suited to determining
factual issues about an individual source, 83 affording all concerned a
full opportunity to present their case.84 Hence, Congress should
amend the statute to require the state or Administrator to hold a
quas_i-judicial hearing before issuing a DC0. 85
E.

Special Provisions for Retirement, Innovation, and Coal
Conversion

As if the provisions of section 113(d) already discussed were not
sufficiently complicated, Congress added special provisions for three
specific situations.
1. Retirement
Section l 13(d)(3) authorized delayed-compliance orders permitting operation "until July 1, 1979, without any interim schedule of
compliance," for "any source" that "intends to comply by means of
replacement of the facility, a complete change in production process,
or a termination of operation." The discharger had to post a "bond
or other surety" "in an amount equal to the cost of actual compliance . . . and any economic value which may accrue to the owner or
operator . . . by reason of the failure to comply." On failure to replace or retire the facility in accordance with the order, the owner or
operator would forfeit the security without hope of compromise. 86
83. Often due process requires these procedures. For example, when a statute confers
upon a person the right to practice law or to receive welfare payments, the Supreme Court has
held that due process entails allowing a person meeting the statutory requirements to demand
an adjudicative hearing with appropriate procedural safeguards, such as cross examination.
See, eg., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Willner v.
Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (bar admission). However, the due
process clause protects only "life, liberty, or property," U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § I.
While the Supreme Court has held that "property" includes interests to which one is entitled
upon meeting statutory qualifications, as in the bar admission and welfare cases, see Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), discretion
granted the Administrator to deny extensions to those meeting the statutory threshold, confirmed by express legislative history, should refute any argument of statutory entitlement to a
delayed-compliance order: The House Committee flatly denied that the DCO provisions
would create any "entitlement," H.R. REP, No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprinted
in (1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1145. On the other hand, a property interest
within the due process clauses may be created by regulation as well as by statute; thus, if the
EPA or a state creates a right to a DCO, it might well be obliged to afford the discharger an
adjudicative hearing to determine its eligibility.
84. Members of the affected public can be given their say in an adjudicative proceeding as
well as in a legislative one. See, eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1032 (1973),
85. The statute does not specify what procedure the EPA must follow in reviewing DCO's
granted by a state. Present EPA regulations provide an opportunity for written comments and
furnish explanatory material to the public. 43 Fed. Reg. 44522 (1978) (to be codified in 40
C.F.R. §§ 65.04(b) & 65.05).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (Supp. I 1977).
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The expiration of the 1979 deadline for retirement orders moots
the interesting statutory-construction questions raised by this provision. 87 But two policy issues remain: why a separate retirement provision was thought necessary in the first place, and why no
retirement order could extend beyond July 1, 1979.
It makes sense in some cases to allow continued violation by a
facility about to be taken out of service. A million-dollar precipitator might be a reasonable investment for thirty years of emission reduction and wholly unreasonable for three. 88 Moreover, an
extension might reduce pollution in the long run by stimulating investment in new facilities subject to stricter standards rather than
makeshift improvements of outdated facilities. Yet these considerations fail to explain why a separate provision was required; unless
costs and benefits are irrelevant under the general DCO provision, a
plant nearing the end of its life might well qualify for an order as
"unable" to comply. Nevertheless, Congress chose to distinguish retirement orders from ordinary DCO's in two important respects: including a bond requirement and omitting an interim compliance
schedule. The justification for the distinctions, however, is not clear.
Bonds can be a useful incentive to compliance: they are common
conditions of extensions in Illinois. 89 But it seems peculiar to limit
their use to cases in which the source is to be retired rather than
controlled.90 The omission of an interim schedule seems simply misguided: Interim deadlines could help to assure that the replacement
facility is not unjustifiably delayed.
Moreover, the 1979 cutoff date for retirement orders appears entirely unjustified. As in the case of any other delayed-compliance
order, there was no guarantee that compliance with existing plan requirements would cease to be an unreasonable hardship at that
point; that million-dollar precipitator might not be worth five years'
control either. More important, the potential for avoiding unreasonable hardship or encouraging new facilities by delaying compliance
87. Among them are the degree of discretion conferred by the use of the word "may," the
apparent inclusion of mobile sources, and the computation of the bond amount, which arguably requires prediction as to the adverse effects and duration of a future violation.
88. See Mt. Carmel Pub. Util. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 3 Ill. P.C.B. 25 (1971).
89. See Currie, E'!forcement Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 10 Nw. U. L. Rev. 389, 471
n.402 ( 1975).
90. At the same time, Congress's insistence on complete forfeiture regardless of circumstance seems barbaric. One can imagine, for example, a natural disaster incapacitating a new
electric generating plant designed to replace the facility scheduled for retirement. If the extension was properly granted to begin with, a shutdown depriving innocent citizens of electricity
would be perverse; and enforcing substantial forfeiture for continued operation would not be
much better.
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until retirement was not limited to plans currently in effect; if the
retirement provision was a good idea for existing plans, it should
have been a permanent part of the statute.
In short, I would not have made separate provision for extensions
in cases of retirement or replacement of sources. Appropriately flexible provisions for bonds in administrable amounts should have been
made for all delayed-compliance orders, interim schedules required
whenever there was reason to monitor progress, and the standard for
issuance made clearly broad enough to include retirement cases or
any others of unreasonable hardship.
2.

Innovation

Section 113(d)(4) allows up to five years' extension for any implementation-plan deadline for a stationary source willing to experiment with new technology. To qualify for the extension, the
proposed method must satisfy several awkwardly worded conditions:
(1) The control method must be "likely to be adequately demonstrated" by the time the order expires; (2) it must be "not likely to be
employed" without the extension; (3) it must afford promise of
greater emission reduction than "the means . . . which, but for such
order, would be required," or an equivalent reduction at lower cost;
and (4) compliance must be "impracticable" pending its installation.91 While most variances are granted to relieve hardship, section
113(d)(4) is intended to encourage new technology. 92 Thus, inability
to comply on time is not required.
The House bill would have required the new technology to be
"adequately demonstrated" at the time the order was entered, "to
assure that the existence of purely theoretical, experimental, or speculative technology" would not suffi.ce.93 But since technology development needs the greatest encouragement at incipient stages, the
House provision would have thwarted much of its own purpose. In
contrast, the law as enacted, allowing an extension if the source can
establish a likelihood that it will be able to demonstrate within the
period of the order, alleviates this difficulty while remaining true to
the House Committee's objections to delays that are not likely to
produce results.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4) (Supp. I 1977).
92. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1977), reprinted in [1977) U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1138: "This provision authorizes the issuance ofa DCO ••• for the
purpose of encouraging use of innovative continuous emission reduction technology or pro•
cess." See also S. REP. No. 127,.95th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1977).
93. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1977), reprinted in [1977) U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, l 138.
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The second condition follows naturally from the purpose of the
provision: If adequate incentives to employ new methods already
exist, there is no need to allow a delay. Yet this condition may prove
difficult to apply. Discerning whether a discharger requires a fiveyear extension to experiment with new technology involves a heavy
dose of speculation.
The third condition also follows from the statutory purpose:
Congress sought to encourage technology superior to "presently
available means."94 Unfortunately, section l 13(d)(4)(c) does not use
this terminology; rather it states that the new technology must be
better than what otherwise "would be required." The provision apparently assumes that present plans mandate the best available technology, but that is not necessarily so. If existing technology is
capable of exceeding current standards, the statute would appear to
permit an extension to develop new controls no better than those
currently available. Luckily, the statute's use of the discretionary
"may," coupled with the legislative history, should permit the
Agency to insist on a promise of bettering existing technology, but
the provision is yet another example of loose drafting.
The final condition makes perfect sense; a source should not receive an extension if it practicably can meet present standards while
the new equipment is being installed. In determining what is "practicable," the Administrator should bear in mind that interim control
facilities are to be replaced in a few years by the fruits of section
113(d)(4) technological innovation; it would defeat the purpose of
the innovation to deny an extension because conventional controls
would be practicable as a long-term altemative. 95
Two final aspects of section 113(d)(4) merit attention. The provision does not authorize a blanket five-year extension, but requires
that the new technology be applied "as expeditiously as practicable."
Thus, while extra time is afforded, it is not a fiat reward for committing resources to development; the provision grants only the extra
time needed to employ new technology. Of course, practicability in
this context should include an opportunity to develop the technology
94. Id. at 61, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1139. Congress also
sought to encourage development of present technology at significantly lower cost, energy use,
or nonair environmental impact. Id.
95. The House Report's example is illustrative: Afterburners might assure interim compliance with hydrocarbon standards, but their use "could result in duplicative and perhaps prohibitive capital expenditures for presently available and new technology, the use of scarce
natural gas, and the prospect of interim compliance proble~ in certain areas due to limited
supplies of natural gas," H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1977), reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1139.
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further, ifwe are not in effect to reinstate the rejected House requirement that the technology be demonstrated before the extension is
given. Finally, the statute places the risk that the innovation will not
work squarely on the operator, for a section 113(d)(4) order must
require compliance within five years, regardless of success. In short,
while the policy behind section 113(d)(4) is admirable, Congress's
understandable caution in avoiding abuses may significantly
dampen the enthusiasm of those intended to be lured by the carrot of
delayed compliance.
3.

Coal Conversion

Prompted by the oil crisis of 1973, Congress in 1974 authorized
postponement of plan deadlines applicable to fuel-burning sources
under circumstances prescribed in considerable detail. 96 Section
113(d)(5), adopted in 1977, replaces and extends this section. The
new provision authorizes the Administrator to postpone until December 31, 1980, with possible renewal for another five years, any
plan requirement applicable to a "major stationary source ... burning petroleum products or natural gas" that has been forced to convert to coal either by order of the Federal Energy Administration or
because of a government-approved curtailment of natural-gas supplies. The order, however, must contain interim requirements to assure that emissions from the source "will not cause or contribute to
concentrations . . . in excess of any national primary ambient air
quality standard," and violation of such standards anywhere in the
Air Quality Control Region creates a rebuttable presumption against
issuing the order.97
Not so long ago, industries planned conversion from coal to
cleaner fuels to reduce particulate and sulfur-oxide emissions. 98
Since then, however, conversion back to coal has become a congressional policy external to the Clean Air Act.99 An operator forced to
tum to coal may encounter extreme and blameless hardship, for it
may take longer to build control equipment for coal's emissions than
to accomplish the fuel switch itself. 100
Of course, a source in such a position might be "unable to com96. See Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319,
sec. 3, § 119, 88 Stat. 246 (1974) (repealed 1977).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(5) (Supp. I 1977).
98. See, e.g., A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2 Ill. P.C.B. 521
(1971).
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 792(a) (1976).
100. The most obvious example is a plant already equipped to bum either coal or gas, but
without pollution controls.
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ply" with plan requirements and thus qualify for relief under the
general provisions of section 113(d)(l). However, the 1979 deadline
for pre-1976 plan requirements in section 113(d)(l) was plainly too
strict for coal conversions, especially since the FEA might issue coalconversion orders after 1979. Indeed, it might issue such orders after
the 1985 deadline in the conversion provision itself; if that happens,
Congress will have to change the statute once more. 101 The provision exemplifies a principle manifested throughout the 1977 Amendments: the price of temporary provisions is continued legislative
tinkering.
Curiously, the coal-conversion situation, which might appear to
offer the most compelling case for delayed compliance, is the only
instance under section 113(d) in which no extension may postpone
compliance with a primary air-quality standard. The notion that
hardship should not compromise public health is of course appealing, but the other paragraphs of section 113(d) apparently concede
that absolute health protection sometimes carries an unacceptable
cost.
Perhaps Congress believed that if a source failed to obtain a conversion extension, the FEA order necessitating conversion would be
modified accordingly. After all, requiring shutdown of an electric
plant facing a conversion order could impose catastrophic hardships
on the community. Nevertheless, the statute does require the order
to be modified.
It is also striking that coal-conversion extensions are the only section 113(d) extensions that may be issued only by the Administrator
and not by a state. Possibly the great potential for harm stemming
from such extensions (limited as they are to "major" sources) induced Congress to keep them under federal control, but extensions
under the other paragraphs possess similar potential. Habit more
likely explains the greater strictures on coal orders: Congress imposed the primary-standard requirement and excluded state orders
in the 1974 coal-conversion provision. On the other hand, the states
remain free under section 116 to impose more stringent requirements
that may frustrate the federal policy of requiring conversion without
unreasonable cost.
Finally, section 113(d)(5) does not seem to cover all cases of undue hardship resulting from coal. conversion. The 1974 statute extended relief to certain operators who had in fact moved to coal
IOI. The temporary nature of the provision is further underscored by the requirement that,
to qualify for a conversion extension because of curtailment in gas supply, a source must have
given notice by August 8, 1978.
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without being required to. The new law, in contrast, refrains from
encouraging conversions that are not coerced, provides no relief if
gas has become too expensive, and gives no quarter to those whose
oil supplies have disappeared or become unreliable.
In short, the complex yet incomplete provisions for coal conversion are but another illustration of Congress's insistence on prescribing administrative details rather than enacting a general
authorization for relief from unreasonable hardship. Unfortunately,
as we move beyond section 113(d) into the other sections of the 1977
Amendments, we will find many other examples.
II.

SMELTERS AND EMERGENCIES

A.

Smelter Orders

Primary nonferrous smelters may qualify for delayed-compliance
orders under the provisions of section 113(d). In the alternative, they
may obtain relief under the new section 119, 102 but no smelter "may
receive both an enforcement order under [section 113(d)] ... and a
primary nonferrous smelter order'' under section 119. 103
Primary nonferrous smelter orders provide relief where "no
means of emission limitation" to meet a sulfur-oxide standard "necessary and intended to be of itself sufficient" to achieve primary and
secondary ambient standards "has been adequately demonstrated to
be reasonably available," considering all costs. 104 Only smelters that
existed when Congress adopted the 1977 Amendments qualify. An
initial order may extend compliance until January 1, 1983; a second
and final one to January 1, 1988. 105 The source must take interim
measures to prevent violation of the air-quality standards, 106 and
those measures must "include continuous emission reduction technology" 107 unless its use ''would be so costly as to necessitate perma102. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 119, 42 U.S.C. § 7419 (Supp. I 1977).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(a)(2)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(b) (Supp. I 1977). The order may be issued either by the Administrator or, with federal approval, by a state. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(a)(I) (Supp. I 1977).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(c) (Supp. I 1977).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(d)(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977). This requirement provides a handhold for
the EPA's prior practice ofm'lking the user of intermittent controls responsible for any ambient violations in the area. See note 114 i'!fra. Referring to this provision, the House Committee
expressly said that "Any occurrence of any such standard being exceeded in a designated liability area for such a smelter would be a violation of the applicable implementation plan by
the smelter •••." H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 n.6 (1977), reprinted in (1977)
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1140.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(d)(l)(C) (Supp. I 1977). A smelter already employing continuous
controls need not add others unless the Administrator finds them "reasonably available." 42
U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4) (Supp. I 1977).
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nent or prolonged temporary cessation of operations." 108 The use of
"any such interim measures" is conditioned on agreement "to commit reasonable resources to research and development of appropriate
emission control technology." 109
1.

Interpretation

Understanding this mouthful requires a bit of background. Most
domestic copper is produced from sulfide ores, and the process generates about two tons of sulfur dioxide for each ton of copper. 110 If
this gas is sufficiently concentrated, it can economically be converted
into sulfuric acid and sold. 111
Before the 1977 Amendments, Nevada's implementation plan required Kennecott Copper Corporation to control sulfur-dioxide
emissions by means of a relatively inefficient acid plant, and to curtail copper production when adverse atmospheric conditions caused
the remaining emissions to violate ambient standards. The EPA had
ruled, with judicial approval, 112 that section i 10 generally required
"continuous" rather than "intermittent" controls, 113 but it agreed
that to require Kennecott to install a more efficient acid plant would
be economically unreasonable and thus allowed periodic cutbacks as
an interim measure, subject to certain conditions, 114 which the Ninth
Circuit sustained over the company's objections in Kennecott Copper
Cop. v. Train. 115
In 1977 Congress codified in a new section 123 the EPA's requirement that ambient standards be met by continuous controls. In
so doing it omitted from that section the recognized exception for
cases, such as Kennecott, in which additional continuous controls
108. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(d)(l)(C)(ii) (Supp. I 1977).
110. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149, 1150 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
111. See 41 Fed. Reg. 2232 (1976). While traditional scrubbing of the remaining acidplant emissions was considered to have bet:n "demonstrated," its use on smelters was deemed
prohibitively expensive. Id.
112. See, eg., Big River Elec. Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 523 F.2d 16 (6th
Cir. 1975).
113. The statute required that an implementation plan contain "emission limitations •..
and such other measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such
[air-quality] . . . standard." 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(B). The EPA construed this to mean that
"other measures" could be required only if reasonable "emission limitations" were insufficient,
and ruled that intermittent cutbacks were not "emission limitations." For criticism see Currie,
supra note 2, at 375-77.
114. The Agency insisted that the company employ additional continuous controls as they
became reasonably available, required Kennecott to conduct research to speed their availability, and made the Company agree to be responsible for any ambient violations in the area.
115. 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
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were not available at reasonable cost. 116 Thus the new section 119
was necessary to "confirm . . . the Agency's . . . smelter policy" as
upheld in the Kennecott case. 117
Through the lens of this history, the opaque contours of section
119 begin to assume definition. The apparent contradiction between
section l 19(d)(l)(A)'s requirement that air-quality standards be met
and section l 19(b)(3)'s prerequisite that "no means of emission limitation" be "reasonably available" to meet them is explained by the
distinction between continuous and intermittent techniques. A
smelter qualifies for relief from section 123's ban on intermittent
measures if, as in Kennecott, it cannot reasonably achieve ambient
standards by continuous "emission limitation" devices such as acid
plants alone. Absent unusual circumstances, however, some continuous "reasonably available control technology" will still be required
even though it is insufficient .to meet present standards; 118 furthermore, although the Conference Committee badly butchered the relevant language, 119 the new section 119 requires, as approved in
Kennecott, a commitment to develop better continuous control technology.120

Congress could have accomplished the same result in a more decipherable manner by codifying both halves of the Kennecott doctrine in one section: "Ambient standards must be achieved by
116. 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (Supp. I 1977).
117. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CooE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1139.
I 18. As the EPA said in an explanatory document quoted with approval by the House
Committee, "RACT [reasonably available control technology] will usually equate to control of
all strong gas streams [through] properly operated and maintained double contact acid plants
(or single contact acid plants where . . . already on line)," 41 Fed. Reg. 7450, 7452 (1976),
Intermittent cutbacks or high stacks will be allowed as supplementary measures when the acid
plant alone is not enough to meet ambient standards.
119. See H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CooE
CONG & Ao. NEWS 1077, I 141.
120. For the Kennecoll requirement, see note 114 supra. The House bill provided flatly
that the smelter operator "shall" commit development resources, H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1977). It would also have conditioned the "use of any such interim measures" upon the smelter's acceptance of means to "maximize the reliability and enforceability
qf such interim measures" and upon agreement to accept responsibility for any local ambient
violations without proof of causation. Id. at 370-71. As adopted, the statute omitted the strict
liability provision for local ambient violations, substituting development funds as another condition of "such interim measures." The antecedent for "such" is obscure - in both the House
bill and the statute the reference follows the requirement that "such interim measures include
"continuous emission reduction technology." Evidently, Congress intended to refer back to
permission to use any interim measures, not only the insufficient continuous technology, since
the enforceability and causation provisions made sense only in relation to intermittent controls. One conclusion is clear - the phraseology is poor. The statute should have made technology development a condition for gaining permission to deviate from§ 123's requirement of
continuous emission reduction.
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continuous emission reduction unless it is not reasonably available."
By separating the two parts, Congress made the statute unnecessarily
mysterious. 121 Furthermore, by limiting the Kennecott qualification
to sulfur dioxide emissions from smelters, Congress ran the risk of
underinclusiveness: there may be future ambient requirements attainable only through methods outlawed by section 123. Once again,
Congress could have solved the problem adequately and much more
simply by drafting a general provision for relief from unreasonable
hardship.
·
2. Public Hearings
The hearing provisions of section 119 are as difficult to fathom as
its substantive requirements, but not because of unnecessary complexity: with respect to hearings the statute is excessively cryptic.
The House bill would have combined smelter orders with other
delayed-compliance orders under what became section l 13(d) and
would have subjected both to a "public hearing" requirement. 122 As
adopted, section 119 contains only a backhanded reference to "any
hearing conducted under this section, in the case of an application
... for a sec;ond order." 123 It makes no mention of any hearing for
the first order, and it does not explicitly require one for the second.
To unravel this mystery, we must follow the bill's path through
the Conference Committee. Two things occurred in the Confeience.
First, the Committee accidentally omitted the- explicit hearing requirement from section 119 when it removed smelter orders from
section 113(d)'s general provision for delayed compliance. Second,
the Committee deliberately limited smelter-order hearings to renew121. Splitting the Kennecott doctrine also makes comparison of smelter extensions with
§ I 13(d)'s extension provisions more difficult. However, understanding the distinct purposes
of the smelter provisions and the general DCO provision clears most of the bramble. For
instance, § 119, unlike § I 13(d), does not authorize postponement of compliance with either
primary or secondary ambient standards. This distinction makes sense if the intermittent or
dispersive controls sanctioned under § 119 are not unreasonably expensive; if they are, the
smelter may receive some relief under general provisions of§ I 13(d). On the other hand,§ 119
permits extensions up to nine years longer than § I 13(d), since Congress knew the economic
barriers to strict smelter compliance were not amenable to quick solution. Nevertheless, Congress's general philosophy of technology-forcing precluded an open-ended extension provision
even for smelters: Not intending "to force some smelters to close at the end of 10 years" and
not "certain that the necessary means of emission limitation . . . be made reasonably available," the House Committee was nonetheless ''unwilling to concede at this point that the necessary development work cannot be completed within that [10 year] period," H.R. REP. No.
294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1977), reprinted in [1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077,
1140. Congress instead chose to leave subsequent amendment, if necessary, as a safety valve.

Id.
122. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368-69 (1977).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(2)(B) (Supp. I 1977).
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als after the initial order. As the Conference Committee explained,
"orders may be issued for an initial 5-year extension without public
hearings" except in special cases; 124 but "prior to granting a second
order ... , there must be notice and a public hearing." 125
Unfortunately, the Conference Report does not say why the
Committee deleted the hearing requirement for an initial order. By
requiring each applicant to establish that it met statutory criteria 126
instead of flatly postponing the continuous-control requirement for
all existing smelters, Congress seems to have indicated its recognition that local circumstances - the size of the operation, the height
of preexisting stacks, the prevailing weather, the surrounding terrain - may determine whether an acid plant will achieve ambient
standards. These adjudicative facts, which seem to warrant a hearing, are no less relevant to initial orders than to renewal.
Evidently, then, it was not these adjudicative facts that prompted
Congress to require a renewal hearing. Indeed the hearing is apparently to be a "legislative" one127 better suited to determining facts of
general applicability, such as the state of developing technology.
Congress apparently thought Kennecott resolved the technology issue for initial orders, but that the question should be reexamined at
renewal time in 1983.
Thus the critical adjudicative facts are to be determined upon
renewal in a legislative hearing, and upon initial application by
whatever procedure the EPA may devise. I have argued above that
legislative hearings are less than ideal for this purpose, 128 and a
wholly documentary procedure would still more seriously inhibit
meaningful public participation. Since Congress agreed that public
participation was essential, 129 it should have required an adjudicatory hearing for both initial and renewal smelter orders, and the
EPA should use its discretion to provide one.
124. When the applicant proposes avoiding the use of any continuous controls, a hearing
on the record is required. See 42 U.S.C. § 7419(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
125. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. Coon
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1502, 1519.
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 7419(a)(2)(B) (Supp. I 1977).
127. In the House bill, the "public hearing" requirement applied both to smelter orders
and to delayed-compliance orders under what became§ I 13(d), and the accompanying Report
explained that a legislative hearing was intended, see H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
358, 368 (1977).
128. See text at notes 76-85 supra. Since the statute gives no right to obtain such an order,
H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. Coon CoNo. & Ao.
NEWS 1077, 1146, the Constitution does not require an adjudicatory hearing unless the regulations confer an entitlement. See note 83 supra.
129. See notes 23 & 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
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B. Emergency Suspensions

Fuel shortages during "the severe winter of 1977" 130 prompted
the House to include a provision - once ·again separate from section
113(d)-that would have allowed governors to suspend implementation-plan requirements temporarily in the face of a serious "economic or energy emergency." 131 The Conference Committee split
this provision into two dist~ct parts, codified in sections l l0(f) and
(g).132

Section 1I0(f), the more significant of the two, regulates "energy"
emergencies. "Upon application by the owner or operator of a fuel
burning stationary source," a governor "after notice and opportunity
for public hearing . . . may petition the President" to determine personally that an emergency exists "of such severity" as to require "a
temporary suspension of any part" of a state-adopted implementation plan. 133 If the President so :finds, the governor may suspend for
not over four months "any part" of the plan if a suspension will alleviate "high levels of unemployment or loss of necessary energy supplies for residential dwellings." 134 A section ll0(f) suspension is not
renewable, 135 and the Administrator may veto it if it does not meet
the stipulated criteria. 136
Within months of its enactment, section l lO(f) was invoked. A
prolonged coal strike in the winter of 1977-1978 reduced fuel supplies in several states to dangerously low levels. Ohio, followed by
six other states, sought and received a presidential declaration of
emergency. 137
The Ohio experience illustrates several weaknesses in the emergency provision. First, although the statute unambiguously requires
"opportunity for a public hearing" before the governor seeks presidential action, the President declared the Ohio emergency without
benefit of a hearing, instead requiring that one be held within the
next seven days. 138 Later the EPA feebly explained that, while this
130. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1977), reprinted in [1977) U.S. CODE
CONG & AD. NEWS 1077, 1281.
13 I. See id. at 354.
132. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, §§ I IO(f), (g), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(f), (g) (Supp. I
1977).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(I) (Supp. I 1977).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(1)·(3) (Supp. I 1977). The President may issue such an order for a
federally adopted plan. 42 U.S.C. § 74IO(f)(4) (Supp. I 1977).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 74IO(f)(3) (Supp. I 1977).
137. See 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1579, 1923 (1978).
138. See id. at 1726.
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action "may not have been strictly in accordance with the procedural
requirements," it was taken "in light of the need to respond quickly
to a crisis." 139 But Congress adopted the hearing requirement to ensure that the public interest in a clean environment weigh heavily in
the energy emergency balance, and the failure to respect it was
flagrant. Of course, advance hearings are not always practicable in
emergencies; but the statute makes no accommodation for that situation. If Congress, upon reflection, is unhappy with the balance that
the statute strikes, it should amend.
Second, although the President's declaration purported to authorize suspension only of particulate regulations, Ohio suspended
sulfur-oxide regulations as well. 140 The statute's phrasing superficially favors Ohio's interpretation: If the President finds suspension
of "any part" of the plan necessary, the state may suspend "any
part" of.the plan if to do so will alleviate hardship. Ohio's conclusion is not unavoidable, however, for by repeating the term "any
part" Congress may have intended to allow the state to suspend only
what the President thought required suspending. Although an EPA
official opined that Ohio's action "seemed" legal, 141 the President's
interpretation more readily corresponds with the congressional insistence on presidential control of suspensions. 142 This problem stems
from the needlessly complex institutional structure of section l lO(f ),
which goes overboard by requiring the governor, the President, and
the EPA all to concur in a decision that must be made swiftly.
The President also limited the declaration to thirty days, 143 and
then renewed it for another thirty. 144 These dispositions pose two
problems. First, the statute flatly prohibits renewal of suspensions:
"Not more than one such suspension may be issued for any source
on the basis of the same set of circumstances or . . . the same emergency." 145 On the other hand, the statute mandates that a suspension is to be effective "for a maximum of four months or such lesser
period as may be specified in a disapproval order of the Administra- ·
139. Id. at 1727.
140. See id. at 1579.
141. Id.
142. The statute preserves ultimate federal control through the EPA's power to veto the
suspension if it will not help to alleviate the emergency, but Congress thought that authority
insufficient; the President's prior determination that relaxation of standards may be necessary
is an independent requirement.
143. See 8 ENVIR. REP., supra note 137, at 1579.
144. See id. at 1780.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
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tor." 146 Since the governor is supposed to issue the suspension, it
would seem that the governor, and not the President, determines the
duration of the relief within the four-month maximum. Thus, it may
be that the President had no power to limit the state's initial authority to thirty days, and that his later renewal of the suspension was
not only illegal, but also unnecessary.
On the other hand, allowing the President to determine the duration as well as the existence of the emergency fits I)lore compatibly
with the congressional policy of presidential control. The President
has power to define the geographical scope of the emergency, for he
may determine that either a "national" or a "regional" emergency
exists, and only governors of states "covered by the President's determination" may issue suspensions. 147 The statute likewise requires a
presidential finding that "temporary" suspension may be necessary
to deal with the emergency. 148 This provision arguably empowers
the President to define the duration of the emergency, and indicates
that the four-month limitation is an additional safeguard, not a license for governors to give longer relief than the President thinks
necessary. 149
If the President is to be bothered personally with determining
whether an emergency exists, he should be given clear authority to
define the emergency in all respects, including its duration. Moreover, since there is no reason to believe that energy emergencies will
last only four months, Congress's limitation in section 1IO(f) seems
artificial. The renewable thirty-day suspensions authorized in the
Ohio case were a much more responsible, flexible course than the
nonrenewable four-month suspension apparently contemplated by
the statute.
The basic policy of section l IO(f) is beyond criticism, for it may
sometimes be better to violate even primary ambient standards than
to allow widespread loss of jobs or of residential heating. President
Carter, however, sounded an appropriate word of caution in declaring an emergency in Kentucky: Suspensions should be granted
146. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(3) (Supp. I 1977).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(l) (Supp. I 1977). Similarly, I have argued above that the President may determine the pollutants for which controls may be relaxed. See text at notes 140-42
supra.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
149. The ban on renewal orders applies only to the "suspension . . . issued to a source,"
not to the President's emergency declaration. However, in Ohio's case this distinction would
have made no difference since the Governor quite properly had not attempted to grant suspensions of greater duration than the emergency that had been declared. See 8 ENVIR. REP., supra
note 137, at 1579.

Michigan Law Review

184

[Vol. 78:155

"sparingly and as a 'last resort," since turning off a precipitator might
save only a small amount of energy yet create a substantial health
risk. 150 Section 11 O(f), like most of the variance provisions of the
Clean Air Act, does not require a determination that the costs of
compliance exceed the benefits.
In short, like all the other variance provisions, section llO(f) is
too restrictive in some respects, too lax in others, and too detailed to
be free from serious ambiguities and drafting errors. Energy emergencies, like the other special problems for which complicated variance provisions were scattered almost randomly throughout the Act,
could have been handled more rationally by a general provision allowing variance for unreasonable hardship.
Section 11 O(g), the second emergency provision, was reduced to
minor significance by the Conference Committee. The governor,
without prior federal approval but subject to subsequent EPA reversal, may temporarily suspend a plan requirement for up to four
months 151 when necessary "to prevent the closing for one year or
more of any source" resulting in "substantial increases in unemployment." 152 As in section l IO(f), the provision does not require that
the unemployment be unreasonable in comparison with the benefits
of compliance. But the kicker is that section l IO(g) applies only
when the state has submitted a proposed plan revision that "meets
the requirements of this section" and the EPA has failed to pass
upon the revision within the period prescribed by the statute. 153
Since "the requirements of this section" include assurance that ambient standards will not be violated, 154 section 11 O(g) amounts only to
transforming the EPA's agreement with the state determination from
a condition precedent into a condition subsequent during an economic emergency.

III.

NONATIAINMENT AREAS

A.

Background

The attentive reader may have observed that the bewildering array of specialreliefprovisions in sections 113(d), 119, and llO(f) and
(g) does essentially nothing for poor Los Angeles, which we left fac150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 1648.
42 U.S.C. § 7410(g)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
42 U.S.C. § 7410(g)(l)(B) (Supp. I 1977).
42 U.S.C. § 7410(g)(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(B) (Supp. I 1977).
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ing an eighty percent arterial blockage in the summer of 1977. 155
Moreover, Los Angeles was by no means alone.
The basic requirement of the 1970 Act, it will be remembered,
was that primary ambient standards be achieved no later than five
years after plan approval, which for the initial standards meant 1977.
In 1975, however, the EPA reported to Congress that "[o]f the 247
air quality control regions in the Nation, 60 are projected not to meet
standards by statutory deadlines" with respect to particulates, and
many would fail to meet other standards as well. 156 If the deadlines
had been strictly enforced, existing sources in those regions would
have been shut down, with seriously disruptive effects. Moreover,
construction of new sources in a noncomplying region seemed to be
precluded altogether, since new emissions would contribute to continuing violations of the primary standard. 15 7
Agreeing that section 110 could not be read "to allow a major
new source to make an existing primary NAAQS violation worse" 158
but unwilling to abort all new sources, the EPA adopted an "offset"
or "tradeofl'' policy. A major new source would be permitted in an
area not meeting an ambient standard if, among other things, its
emissions of the offending pollutant were offset by reductions of existing emissions sufficient to produce "a positive net air quality benefit in the affected area." 159 Since this policy could not prevent the
shutdown of existing sources in places like Los Angeles, the EPA
also sought from Congress the power to extend plan deadlines
"where transportation measures are necessary for the attainment of
... [ambient] standards, and where the implementation of such
control measures would have serious adverse social or economic effects." 160 The offset policy and the EPA's legislative proposal were
the raw materials from which the Conference Committee produced
Part D of the 1977 Amendments, "Plan Requirements for Nonat155. See text at note 7 supra.
156. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 207-08 (1977), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1286 (reprinting letter from EPA Administrator Russell Train to
Senator Edmund Muskie, May 12, 1975).
157. See id. at 210, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1289. Using similar
reasoning, the Illinois Pollution Control Board held that new connections to a municipal sewage treatment facility not meeting effluent standards would violate those standards themselves.
League of Women Voters v. North Shore San. Dist., 1 Ill. P.C.B. 369, 384-85 (1971).
158. 41 Fed. Reg. 55527 (1976).
159. 41 Fed. Reg. 55528-29 (1976). The Illinois Board adopted a similar offset policy by
allowing new connections to overloaded sewers as long as they were offset by corresponding
reductions elsewhere. Currie, supra note 89, at 422.
160. See 4 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2004 (1974); Currie, supra note 2, at 389-90.
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tainment Areas" 161 -those Air Quality Control Regions, or portions of regions, in which "any national ambient air quality
standard" is not met.162
The heart of the new provisions is section 172, which effectively
authorizes postponing the date for compliance with primary standards until 1982 or, in the case of oxidants or carbon monoxide, until
1987, if that is "as expeditiously as practicable." 163 Subject to specified conditions, a new state plan may both relax requirements applicable to existing sources and allow the construction of new sources.
The nonattainment provisions are a major concession to reality. 164
The statute, however, goes about all this in a curiously roundabout way. First, it nowhere states explicitly that the Administrator
may approve a plan not meeting the three-year deadline of section
l 10(a)(2)(A). 165 Further, in contrast to the provisions governing promulgation of initial plans, 166 the new statute does not necessarily
authorize the Administrator to prescribe an appropriate nonattainment-area plan if the state fails to do so. 167 Instead, it relies princi161. For a detailed explication of the new requirements, see Raffle, Prevention ofSignificant
.Deterioration and Nonallainment Under the Clean Air Act-A Comprehensive Review, ENVlR.
REP. (BNA) Monograph No. 27 (1979).
162. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 171(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (Supp. I 1977),
referring to§ 107(d)(l){A)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(l)(A)-(c) (Supp. I 1977). "Attainment" areas, those in which "any" ambient standard is not shown to be violated, are subject to distinct
statutory requirements designed to prevent "significant deterioration." 42 U.S.C., §§ 7471,
7407(d)(l)(D), (E) (Supp. I 1977). The same area may thus be classified as an attainment area
for one pollutant and as a nonattainment area for another.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 7502{a)(2) (Supp. I 1977). The EPA's offset regulations were to remain in
force until mid-1979, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 129(a). See H.R. REP. No. 564,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. Cooe CONG. & Ao. News 1502, 1538.
For the EPA's interpretation of the new requirements, see 44 Fed. Reg. 20372 (1979) (to be
codified in 40 C.F.R. § 52). An earlier memorandum on the subject is located at 8 ENVJR.
REP. (BNA) 1714 (1978). The agency's revised offset policy, which governs in the interim,
may be found in 44 Fed. Reg. 3282 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 51, App. S).
164. Interim relief for communities like Los Angeles was provided by a new§ l lO(c)(4), 42
U.S.C. § 7410(c)(4) (Supp. I 1977), which authorized a governor, "after notice and opportunity
for public hearing," to suspend certain transportation control requirements pending submission of a nonattainment plan. The provisions subject to suspension were those requiring retrofit of noncommercial vehicles, reduction of on-street parking, and "gas rationing which the
Administrator finds would have seriously disruptive and widespread economic or social effects." The suspension was to last only until January 1, 1979, or until the state submitted its
revision, "whichever is earlier." However, the revision is ineffective until approved by the
EPA; between its submission and approval there may be widespread violations. The Agency
will presumably overlook them, but the matter should not have been left to the Administrator's
discretion.
165. That the extension is approvable is implicit; otherwise the entire nonattainment provision would be of no effect.
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 74IO(a)(l), (c){l) (Supp. I 1977).
167. The statute authorizes federal revision only when ambient standards are altered or the
Administrator finds an existing plan inadequate. 42 U.S.C. §§ 74IO{a)(2)(H)(ii), (c)(l)(C)
(Supp. I 1977). Yet the nonattainment provisions apply wherever ambient standards are vio-
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pally on blackmail: Any state failing to adopt a satisfactory
nonattainment plan by mid-1979 faced not only a ban on the construction of new major stationary sources contributing to ambient
violations, 168 but the loss of federal funds for construction of highways169 and sewage-treatment facilities as well. 170
Economic necessities would doubtless have brought about de
facto relaxations of the deadlines even if the statute had not been
amended. What Congress was trying to coerce was rather the adoption of the accompanying provisi_ons for assuring compliance as soon
as practicable. Even so, the means seem ill-suited to the end. Congress could better have assured the desired revisions by requiring the
EPA to make them if the states defaulted. Moreover, it seems both
unfair to innocent owners of new sources and contrary to the federal
nonattainment policy that the remedy for state inaction is to forbid
new construction altogether. 171
Nevertheless, despite some delays, the states are falling into
line; 172 nonattainment plans will in all likelihood soon be universal.
lated, including any areas in which the existing plan, while not being enforced, is facially
adequate.
168. Section l 10(a}(2)(I) requires that a plan forbid construction or modification of such a
source after June 30, 1979, unless at the time a permit is sought "such plan meets the requirements of part D." 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(I) (Supp. I 1977). Section 172 provides in tum that a
plan satisfying § 110(a}(2)(I) must assure attainment of ambient standards by the appropriate
1982 or 1987 deadlines. 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. I 1977).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a) (Supp. I 1977). This prohibition applies only to states failing to
adopt plans for transportation sources.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 7616(b)(2) (Supp. I 1977). The authority to withhold sewage funds is
discretionary.
171. Moreover, the EPA has warned that broad application of the provisions for cutting off
federal grants could have "disastrous effects." 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1351 (1978).
172. Section 406(d) of the 1977 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 795, as amended
Pub. L. No. 95-190 § 14(b)(6}, 91 Stat. 1405 (not codified in 42 U.S.C.), imposed a deadline of
August 7, 1978, or nine months after adoption of implementing regulations, whichever was
later, for submission of revised plans "required" by the amendments. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401
note (West 1978). The EPA translated the nine-month requirement into a January I, 1979
deadline. See 44 Fed. Reg. 20372, 20373 (1979). Only seven states met those deadlines. See 9
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1739 (1979). The EPA, however, valuing chari~ above obedience to the
statute, took several steps to reduce hardship. The construction bar was deemed to apply only
to permits for which application was made after July I, 1979, later applications would be
processed immediately so that construction could begin as soon as the plan was approved;
plans with minor deficiencies would be conditionally approved so that construction could proceed; and funds would be withheld only from states that did not make good-faith efforts to
· comply. 44 Fed. Reg. 35679 (1979). By November 1979 most states had submitted revised
plans, and though the bulk of them had not been approved, the EPA said it expected only
"isolated" interference with planned construction. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1472-73 (1979).
Transition problems were further complicated by the decisions in United States Steel Corp.
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979), and in Sharon Steel Corp. ·
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979), setting aside the EPA's
designation of nonattainment areas in Alabama and Pennsylvania on the ground that there
was insufficient cause for departing from the notice-and-co=ent procedures of 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b) & (c) (1976). With more respect for congressional policy than for statutory language,
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The following sections examine the requirements for such plans, first
for existing and then for new sources of pollution.
B.

Existing Sources

I. 1982 Requirements

As far as existing sources are concerned, the basic requirements
of a 1982 nonattainment plan are found in the apparently redundant
provisions of sections 172(b)(2) and (3): The new plan must "provide for the implementation of all reasonably available control
measures as expeditiously as practicable," and it must "require, in
the interim, reasonable further progress . . . including such reduction in emissions from existing sources in the area as may be obtained through the adoption, at a minimum, of reasonably available
control technology."113
The Senate Report emphasized that both lead time and "economic or social cost" could be considered in determining what was
"reasonably available." 174 Moreover, despite a disclaimer that "this
bill does not define reasonable measures," 175 the Report gives specific examples that will doubtless be accorded considerable deference
in administering section 172: While "an inspection and maintenance
program [for vehicles] is a reasonable measure," gasoline rationing
"currently" is not, nor is "retrofitting existing cars with currently
available devices." 176 But this provision, reflecting the need it was
designed to meet, postpones only the impracticable: Los Angeles
need not shut down tomorrow, but it must take all reasonable measures as quickly as it can.
Conspicuously missing from section 172, however, as from the
the Fifth Circuit added by way of soothing advice that the ban on new construction would not
apply until plan revisions were actually adopted in accordance with the nonattainment provisions. Until then, the court decreed, the EPA offset ruling would govern.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(2), (3) (Supp. I 1977).
174. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1977). The same term is employed in connection with smelter orders in§ Il9(c)(I). See text at notes 108-11 supra.
175. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1977).
176. Id. The EPA has proposed to determine what transportation-control measures are
"reasonably available" on "a case-by-case basis," with presumption that measures listed in
§ 108(f)(l)(A) (as to which the Agency is to publish information) are reasonably available. 44
Fed. Reg. 20372, 20377 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 52).
To help states achieve ambient standards in nonattainment areas, Congress in § 177, 42
U.S.C. § 7507 (Supp. I 1977), sensibly permitted them to adopt new-vehicle emission standards
more stringent than federal standards. Those standards, however, must be identical to the
ones adopted by California and approved by the EPA under the existing California exception.
This scheme assures that vehicle manufacturers will not be required to produce cars meeting
more than present dual standards. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 213, 310-11
(1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1292, 1389-90.
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delayed-compliance provisions of section 113(d), is any requirement
that the present impracticability . of compliance with the original
deadline not be attributable to the past sluggishness or recalcitrance
of the discharger. 177 The Amendments thus appear to permit a state
to grant a polluter additional time because the operator has made
timely compliance no longer "reasonable" by sitting on its corporate
rump. True, section 172 does not require a state to do so; theoretically, the state may choose not to submit a revised plan. Moreover,
the amendments do not disturb Union Electric's holding that a state
may submit a plan more stringent than federal law requires. 178 But
as in the case of section 113(d), I do not think that Congress should
have granted states the power to insulate dischargers from penalties
for inexcusable violations of federal law.
While the requirements of "reasonably available control measures" and "reasonably available control technology" appear essentially duplicative with respect to existing sources, 179 the provision for
"reasonable further progress" 180 goes further. The statute defines
"reasonable further progress" as "annual incremental reductions in
emissions . . . sufficient . . . to provide for attainment of the . . .
ambient . . . standards by the date required"; it calls for "substantial
reductions in the early years following approval or promulgation"
and "regular reductions thereafter." 181 Thus in this context "reasonable" does not mean at reasonable cost; regular reductions are demanded whether or not practicable, contrary to the sensible policy of
accommodation underlying the entire nonattainment provision. 182
The prospects for achieving "reasonable further progress" in Los
Angeles under this standard seem bleak. The development of public
transportation, perhaps the city's most promising approach to its
177. See text at notes 39-42 supra.
178. Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
179. The requirement that the plan adopt all reasonably available technology "at a minimum," however, seems to anticipate that even unreasonably expensive measures may be required.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(3) (Supp. I 1977).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 7501(1) (Supp. I 1977). The EPA construes this definition to require a
"straight-line rate" of progress determined by "dividing the total emission reductions required
•.• by the number of years between 1979 and the date projected for attainment," allowing
"some lag" in the early years "if immediate compliance is not possible." See 8 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) 1714, 1715 (1978).
182. The legislative history confirms this interpretation. The House bill would have required reduction of emissions in equal two-year installments. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 212 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 1077, 1291.
While the Conference Committee thought this requirement too rigid, it stressed that "regular,
consistent emission reductions will be demonstrated .•. throughout the period," H.R. REP.
No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS
1502, 1538.
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problem, seems less likely to cause substantially equal incremental
reductions in emissions than a dramatic improvement several years
hence. Los Angeles may yet have to reduce gasoline sales ten percent
a year.
2. 1987 Requirements
A revised plan must meet the conditions already discussed, along
with others applicable to new sources, in order to obtain an extension to 1982, when Congress intended that most ambient standards
would be achieved. To qualify for extension of oxidant and carbonmonoxide standards to 1987, a plan must meet additional conditions.
Among other things, the plan must identify new measures, not presently feasible, that will be necessary for attainment by 1987; it must
provide for "a vehicle emission control inspection and maintenance
program"; and by 1982 it must be amended to "contain enforceable
measures to ensure attainment" by December 21, 1987. 183 The interrelationship of these requirements with that of "reasonable further
progress" is not clear. On the one hand, the Conference Report
flatly confirms what the 1987 conditions appear to suggest on their
face: the state "need not make a commitment in 1979 to implement"
measures not "reasonably available." 184 On the other hand, the 1987
provisions do not in terms purport to modify the clear 1982 requirement of "annual incremental reductions" regardless of cost.
The Conference Report also states that, as a further condition for
the 1987 extension, a plan "must require that funds reasonably available to the state or local government be used to improve public
transportation." 185 The diligent reader, however, will search in vain
· to find such a provision· in section 172, where it belongs: instead, it is
hidden in sections 110(a)(3)(D) and 1IO(c)(5)(B).
Upon reading the two provisions, one almost wishes that they
had remained hidden. Section 1IO(a)(3)(D) requires any plan revised beyond 1982 under section 172 to include measures specified
by section 110(c)(5)(B)-specifically, "comprehensive measures
. . . to . . . establish, expand, or improve public transportation
measures to meet basic transportation needs, as expeditiously as
practicable." 186 While public transportation may be a promising av183. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(l l)-(c) (Supp. I 1977). See H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1502, 1537.
184. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., Isl Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE
CONG & Ao. News at 1502, 1537.
185. Id.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(D), (c)(5)(B) (Supp. I 1977).
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enue for achieving ambient standards in many cities, it seems imprudent for Congress to prescribe that course woodenly without
knowing that it will be the most efficient means in every city. San
Francisco's meat may well be Los Angeles's poison. Moreover, even
if public transportation is the best available means of attaining the
standards, Congress has once more failed to acknowledge the possibility that the cost of meeting those standards may be unrealistically
high.
3.

General Implications

In summary, the nonattainment provisions for existing sources
commendably recognize that more time may be necessary to avoid
unreasonable hardship, and the "expeditiously as practicable" requirement applied to each control measure demands a proper comparison of the costs and benefits of delay. Unfortunately, the
provisions are marred on the one side by congressional willingness to
allow states to reward past dilatory behavior and on the other by an
unrealistic insistence upon annual increments of progress whether or
not economically justifiable. Moreover, like all the other variance
provisions they fail to acknowledge the possibility that compliance
with primary standards may in some circumstances never be worth
the cost.
There is an additional problem. The absolute deadlines of 1982
and 1987 demonstrate that the nonattainment provisions were intended not as permanent parts of the statutory scheme but as a temporary response to the supposedly unique problems associated with
achieving the initial group of ambient standards. Yet it seems unreasonable to expect that the achievement of other, more stringent standards promulgated in the future will be free from similar difficulties.
If they occur, Congress will have to intervene once more, while a
general variance provision allowing justifiable extensions, or deletion of the absolute time limits of section 110, would have saved it
the trouble.
C.

I.

New Sources

The Permit Requirement

Under section 172(b)(6), a nonattainment-area plan rev1S1on
must "require permits for the construction and operation of new or
modified major stationary sources." 187 The section does not specify
187. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (Supp. I 1977). The terms "new" and "modified" have counterparts in § 111, which provides for standards of performance for "new" stationary sources,
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whether permits are required for sources outside the area but affecting it. One might infer that they are not, since the construction ban
to be imposed upon failure to adopt an adequate plan applies only to
sources "in any nonattainment area." 188 Control of outside sources,
however, is indispensable if the goal of the nonattainment provisions
is to be attained. The EPA's offset policy applied to sources outside
the noncomplying area, 189 and the nonattainment sections basically
endorsed that policy. Moreover, whether or not the permit requirement of section l 72(b)(6) applies to outside sources, the EPA should
be able to demand permits from them under the general direction of
section 172(a)(i) that the plan provide for timely achievement of ambient standards in nonattainment areas. 190 Initially the Agency did
defined by§ lll(a)(2) to include "any stationary source, the construction or modification of
which is commenced after the publication of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed regulations)
prescribing [an applicable] standard of performance . . . ." "Modification" in § 111 in tum
means "any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source
which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted." 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(2), (3) (Supp. I
1977). The commencement of construction is not defined in § 111, but the same term is defined for purposes of the provisions for prevention of significant deterioration in § 169(2), 42
U.S.C. § 7479(2) (Supp. I 1977). The nonattainment provisions adopt the § 111 definition of
"modification" but do not define "new sources" either explicitly or by reference. Section
171(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(4) (Supp. I 1977). Nevertheless it seems most probable that the§ 111
definition will be applied by analogy.
I have discussed the meaning of the § 111 terms elsewhere, Currie, l)irect Federal Regulation ofStationary Sources Under the Clean Air Act, - U. PA. L. REV.-, - (1980) (forthcoming), and shall not repeat the discussion here. Suffice it to say that the problem has proved
surprisingly complex. One point, however, deserves mention. After the decision in Alabama
Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1082-85 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the EPA proposed to revise its
nonattainment-plan regulations to incorporate fully the so-called "bubble" concept, under
which there is no "increase in the amount . . . emitted," and thus no permit-triggering "modification," if an increase in emissions from one machine is cancelled by reductions elsewhere in
the same plant. See 44 Fed. Reg. 51924, 51933 (1979), reprinted in IO ENVIR. REP. (BNA)
1112, I 121 (1979). However, ifno nonattainment plan is in effect to assure "reasonable further
progress" toward attaining ambient standards, the individual machine will be considered a
"source" and the "bubble" concept will not apply. The EPA correctly feared that otherwise
rare opportunities to move toward attainment might be missed. Id. at 51932, 10 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) at 1120.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2){1) (Supp. I 1977). The EPA has proposed to construe this
provision to apply to sources outside nonattainment areas but affecting them, 44 Fed. Reg.
38583 (1979). The language, however, is to the contrary.
189. See 41 Fed. Reg. 55524, 55526 (1976); 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3283 (1979).
190. In the converse situation, the District of Columbia Circuit has held the EPA cannot
under provisions for preventing deterioration of allainment areas require permits for sources in
nonattainment areas in the same state. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1082-85
(D.C. Cir. 1979). I have criticized this decision elsewhere, see Currie, Nondegradation and risibility Under the Clean Air Act, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 48 (1980), but the present problem is distinguishable, for the provision construed in Alabama Power expressly required permits only for
construction "in any area to which this part applies," meaning an attainment area. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7475(a) (Supp. I 1977).
In support ofits authority to impose nonattainment requirements on sources in clean areas,
the EPA has pointed to§ 165(a)(3)(B) 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3)(B) (Supp. I 1977), which forbids
construction of such a source if it would cause or contribute to pollution "in excess of any . . •
national ambient air quality standard in any air quality control region." See 44 Fed. Reg.
51924, 51939 (1979), reprinted in IO ENVIR. REP. (BNA) lll2, 1127 (1979). But the EPA's
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intend to apply nonattainment requirements to such sources, 191 but
more recently it announced that it was considering changing that
policy, suggesting that its former position would be "burdensome to
both the permitting authority and the permit applicant." 192
Geographical considerations aside, only a "major" new source
need apply for a permit. Nevertheless the statute may reach more
sources than it should. Section 302G) defines a "major stationary
source" as one with "potential to emit" 193 "one hundred tons per
year of any air pollutant." 194 Hence, contrary to the EPA's position,
the permit requirement is not limited to sources of those pollutants
for which ambient standards have been adopted. 195 Indeed, since
"air pollutant" includes "any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive ... substance," 196 the statute apparently requires the wasteful
process of issuing permits for sources emitting nothing more harmful
interpretation would risk outlawing such sources even if all Part D requirements were met,
since the new source would "contribute to" the continuing violation. Section 165 can be reconciled with the nonattainment provisions by recognizing that the latter effectively postpone the
date when ambient standards apply to the affected areas, so that new emissions do not contribute to pollution "in excess of" any currently applicable standard.
191. 44 Fed. Reg. 20372, 20379 (1979).
192. 44 Fed. Reg. 51924, 51939 (1979), reprinted in 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at 1112, 1127
(1979).
193. The D.C. Circuit rejected the EPA's definition of "potential" emissions as those that
would occur in the absence of control equipment in the context of the nondegradation provisions in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1075-76 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Agency
has acquiesced, proposing to redefine "potential" emissions for both purposes as those expected to result "after the application of air pollution control equipment." See 44 Fed. Reg.
51924, 51929 (1979), reprinted in 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at 1112, 1117 (1979). For criticism see
Currie, supra note 190, at 53-60.
194. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 302(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(i) (Supp. I 1977).
The permit requirement applies to "major new or modified stationary sources," 42 U.S.C.
§ 7502(b)(6) (Supp. I 1977), leaving ambiguous whether a permit is needed when a "major''
source undergoes a modification that increases its potential emissions by less than the 100-ton
threshold. Congress's evident purpose to avoid the cost of processing permits in the absence of
substantial increases in emissions suggests only "major'' modifications should qualify. In the
context of permits for "construction" of "major'' sources in clean areas, the EPA's effort to
limit permits to major modifications was struck down; the relevant provision defines "construction" to include "modification," and the latter includes any changes that "increase" emissions without regard to amount. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1068 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (construing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7479(2)(C), & 741 l(a)(4) (Supp. I 1977)). The nonattainrnent provisions, while similar in design, do not contain the same ironclad language. Nevertheless the EPA has proposed to require permits under both provisions for any modification
of a major source resulting in a "significant" increase in emissions, whether or not meeting the
100-ton standard. See 44 Fed. Reg. 51924, 51958, 51956, 51952 (1979), reprinted in 10 ENVIR.
REP. (BNA) at 1112, 1146, 1144, 1140 (1979).
195. See 44 Fed. Reg. 20372, 20374 (1979), defining "major'' sources as in the revised offset
ruling, 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3283 (1979): "any source for which the potential emission is equal
to or greater than 100 tons per year of any of the following pollutants: particulate matter,
sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, or carbon monoxide." This approach antedated the 1977 Amendments. See 41 Fed. Reg. 55528 (1976).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (Supp. I 1977).
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than water. To limit the cure to the disease, Congress should have
required permits only for sources of pollutants whose concentrations
exceed ambient standards.
Section 173 lists the conditions for permit issuance. 197 The two
most important conditions are discussed in the sections that follow,
but two other conditions deserve special mention. First, all "major
stationary sources" in the same state that are under the applicant's
control must be "in compliance, or on a schedule for compliance,
with all applicable emission limitations and standards" under the
Clean Air Act. 198 This requirement should serve as a powerful incentive to an owner to bring other sources into line, but it may also
inflict penalties disproportionate to the offense, especially since there
is no exception for violations the discharger could not reasonably
prevent. 199 Second, the permit may not be issued unless the entire
state implementation plan is "being carried out" as required by
law. 200 This requirement is even more severe, for it punishes the
new-source applicant for the state's failure to enforce the plan
against other dischargers, a matter over which the applicant has no
control.
2. Lowest Achievable Emission Rate
To obtain a permit, a new source must comply with "the lowest
achievable emission rate"201 (LAER). Section 171(3) defines LAER
as "the most stringent emission limitation . . . contained in the im197. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. I 1977). Comparable permit provisions for new sources in
attainment areas and for all sources under the water-pollution statute require opportunity for a
"public hearing" before issuance or denial of a permit. 42 U.S.C. § 7575(a)(2) (Supp. I 1977);
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(l), (b)(3) (1976). The nonattainment provisions, unfortunately, do not,
Since the permit requirement applies only to "major'' sources, the importance of each application both to the applicant and to the public suggests the desirability of providing a full opportunity for input. Moreover, deciding whether the proposed new source meets the various
statutory requirements may often necessitate determinations of facts peculiar to that source,
and this consideration militates in favor of an adjudicatory hearing. Indeed, if the plan
adopted gives the applicant a right to a permit upon meeting prescribed criteria, due process
very likely will require that he be given the opportunity for such a hearing. See note 83 supra,
Moreover, again in contrast to the water-pollution provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1976),
§ 173 does not provide for EPA review to prevent issuance of a permit contravening statutory
requirements. If the emissions from the new plant actually contravene provisions of the plan
itself, the EPA can sue or issue an order to enforce the requirement, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(l)-(b)
(Supp. I 1977). However, the very basis of the permit requirement is that prevention is preferable to cure.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(3) (Supp. I 1977).
199. Presumably a discharger meeting the conditions of a DCO or other extension is "on
schedule for compliance," but as I pointed out above, a reasonable excuse for inability to
comply does not guarantee the issuance of a DCO. See text at notes 66-76 supra.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(4) (Supp. I 1977).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(2) (Supp. I 1977).
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plementation plan of any State" (unless shown "not achievable") or
"the most stringent emission limitation achieved in practice, . . .
whichever is more stringent."202 Because LAER may not be less
stringent than the standards of performance for new sources under
section 111, it requires use of "the best technological system of continuous emission reduction . . . adequately demonstrated," considering cost.203 The House Report explained that, while "cost is of
somewhat lesser weight" in determining "lowest achievable emission
rate" than under section 111, it remains "a relevant factor'': "if the
cost of any given . . . means of compliance is so great that new . . .
sources could not build and operate, then emission reductions which
necessitate [its] use ... would not be considered achievable
"204

The policy concern underlying this provision is unassailable the law ought to demand special efforts to minimize additional emissions in areas where pollution levels already endanger public
health. 205 The same philosophy prompted the further rule that, if
compliance is extended beyond 1982, the agency issuing the permit
must analyze "altemativ~ sites, sizes, production processes, and environmental control techniques" and insist upon a showing that "benefits of the proposed source significantly outweigh the environmental
and social costs" of its operation.206 Indeed, the latter requirement
more accurately reflects the relevant policies than does the "lowest
achievable" provision: The post-1982 requirement explicitly requires that the benefits of the new source be balanced against the
health risk, while the "lowest achievable" provision conclusively
presumes that the benefits are sufficient if the owner is willing to
install expensive technology.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (Supp. I 1977).
203. 42 U.S'.C. § 74ll(a)(I) (Supp. I 1977).
204. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st ~ess. 215 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CooE
CONG & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1294. The Conference Report is in accord. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &-Ao. NEWS 1502, 1538. The
determination of LAER is to be made by the agency issuing the permit, 42 U.S.C. § 7503(2)
(Supp. I 1977), but for an entire "class or category of source," 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (Supp. I
1977), and with the assistance of"guidance documents" issued by the EPA, 42 U.S.C. § 7508
(Supp. I 1977). Contrast 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (Supp. I 1977), which for purposes of preventing
significant deterioration of attainment areas requires the determination of best available control technology to be made "on a case-by-case basis," seeking marginal additional control at
additional administrative cost.
205. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 214-15 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEws 1077, 1293-94. Whether in light of the independent offset requirement considered at notes 210-28 i,?fra the benefits of requiring technology beyond that prescribed under§ 111 justify the administrative burdens of multiple new-source standards, I am
not certain. See generally Currie, supra note 190.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(ll)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
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Unfortunately, the statute does not say whether LAER is necessary for every pollutant emitted by a major source. The EPA has
concluded that it is not, and its position seems correct. To begin
with, LAER is a means for achieving the purpose of the nonattainment provisions, which is to minimize existing violations of ambient
standards. 207 This purpose demands LAER only for those pollutants
whose concentrations exceed ambient stap.dards. Moreover, the statutory limitation of LAER to "major" sources208 suggests Congress
thought the benefits of such technology not worth the cost of requiring it unless the amount emitted was substantial. The fortuity that a
source is "major" for one pollutant seems no reason to· alter that
policy with respect to other pollutants for which the source is not
major. Accordingly, the EPA position is that LAER is required only
for those pollutants whose ambient standards are violated and for
which at the same time the source is "major."209
3.

Offset and Its Alternative

As a final condition for obtaining a permit, a new source in a
nonattainment area must show that it either conforms to a modified
version of the pre-1977 EPA offset policy or contains alternative provisions adequate to assure that new sources do not impede overall
progress toward timely attainment of ambient standards.
a.

The Offset Requirement

Under this alternative, the reduction of existing emissions may
make room for new ones. The wording of section 173(I)(A) is tricky:
The new source is allowed only if "total allowable emissions" from
existing and new sources are "sufficiently less than total emissions
from existing sources allowed under the applicable implementation
plan" at the time the permit is sought "so as to represent . . . reasonable progress."210 Notice that the statute requires that new emissions
207. This purpose is exemplified by the definition of "reasonable further progress" in
§ 171(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(1) (Supp. I 1977), and by the central requirement of§ 172{a) that
ambient standards be achieved by 1982 or 1987. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(l) (Supp. I 1977).
208. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(b)(6), 7503(2)(Supp. I 1977).
209. See 44 Fed. Reg. 51924, 51959 (1979), proposing 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(3), reprinted in
10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at 1112, 1147 (1979); id. at 51941, 10 ENVIR. REP. at 1129, for a partial
interpretation of the proposal. The pre-1977 offset policy had also required the administrative
equivalent of LAER only "for those pollutants causing the proposed source to be defined as a
'major' source," 41 Fed. Reg. 55528 n.2 (1976). The corresponding provision for clean areas in
§ 165(a)(4), by contrast, requires best available technology for "each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter," whether or not subject to ambient standards and whether or not
ambient standards are met. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (Supp. I 1977).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977). The language is taken largely from the Senate
bill, see S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1977).
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be more than offset: "total allowable emissions" of the offending
pollutant211 must actually be reduced despite the addition of the new
source. Thus Congress viewed the addition of a new source as an
opportunity to create additional incentives to correct existing
problems. The reference to "emissions allowed under the . . .
plan"212 ensures that the new-source owner will implement emission
reductions that were not already overdue213 - the statute gives no
credit for abatement that should have been accomplished in the
past.214 The amount of the required reduction will vary according to
the extent of the ambient violation and the efficacy of other plan
measures required by the nonattainment provisions to make "reasonable further progress" toward ambient standards. The necessary
reductions must take place "by the time the [new] source is to commence operation."215
Under the pre-amendment offset policy, the EPA's guidelines
had explicitly required not only that emission reductions exceed new
emissions, but also that these reductions "provide a positive net air
quality benefit in the affected area." 216 This latter requirement recognized that emissions of identical quantity and concentration may
have disparate effects on ambient quality, depending on their locations, their altitudes, and their timing. Section 173(l)(A) preserved
the essence of the "net air quality benefit" requirement by demanding offset reductions "sufficient□
to represent . . . [with other
reductions] reasonable further progress" toward timely attainment of

...

211. The statute speaks flatly of "total allowable emissions," but the context strongly suggests the sole concern is with those pollutants whose concentration exceeds ambient standards.
See text at note 209 supra.
212. The use of "allowable" rather than actual emissions as the basis for post-construction
assessment is a necessary corollary to avoid penalizing the new source for continuing violations of the implementation plan by other sources.
213. Pressing_this principle further, the EPA before 1977 had also refused to allow credit
for some reductions not required by existing plans. If the plan faced revision due to nonattainment of air-quality standards, credit was allowed only for reductions beyond those resulting
from "reasonably available control measures." See 41 Fed. Reg. 55526 (1976). Since the statutory offset policy applies only after approval of a plan requiring reasonably available control
measures, the result should be the same under the statute, although the Conference Committee
declared that before the approval of new plans the baseline for applying the offset policy
should be the plan in effect at the time of permit application, regardless of its inadequacy.
H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in [1977) U.S. CODE CONG &
Ao. NEWS 1502, 1538.
214. The statutory reference to "allowable emissions" seems also to preserve the EPA's
requirement that offset reductions be "enforceable," that is, that they be made part of the plan
itself or written into a permit or compliance order. 41 Fed. Reg. 55530 (1976).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(l){A) (Supp. I 1977).
216. 41 Fed. Reg. 55529 (1976). The revised interim offset policy preserved this basic requirement. 44 Fed. Reg. 3284 (1979).
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ambient standards. 21 1
What is not so clear, however, is whether the statute modifies the
EPA's requirement that this air-quality benefit occur "in the affected
area." 218 A narrow definition of "affected area" could have limited
the applicability of offset to reductions immediately adjacent to the
new source.219 Section 173, however, refers to a net reduction of
emissions "in the region," 220 and in a regional sense it may be possible to make "reasonable further progress" toward attaining ambient
standards ·by improving the air in one place while degrading it in
another. The flexible terminology appears to allow case-by-case determination whether such a tradeoff does in fact represent "reasonable further progress." In a statute characterized by a lamentable
rigidity, 221 this latitude is a welcome rarity; one only can wish Congress had provided for EPA review of state permit decisions to assure that the underlying polici~s are carried out.
How the offset provision works can be illustrated by a few examples. Suppose the owner of a steel mill presently meeting plan requirements wants to construct a new basic-oxygen furnace on the
same site. If the region where the mill is located exceeds ambient
particulate standards, the owner may obtain the necessary offset
credit by shutting down a set of open-hearth furnaces in the existing
mill, or by fitting them with additional control equipment not
required by the plan, if the resulting reduction of open-hearth emissions sufficiently exceeds the new basic-oxygen emissions to "represent reasonable further progress" toward achieving the ambient
standard. If the new plant is to be built at a considerable distance
from the old one, the different impacts of the old and new emissions
on ambient quality will have to be taken into account in determining
whether "reasonable further progress" is being made.
Even if our steelmaker has no existing emissions of its own that
can practicably be reduced, it may benefit from the offset provisions,
for the statute does not require that the source reducing its emissions
be owned or operated by the person seeking to build the new one.
Section 173(l)(A) refers to "total allowable emissions from existing
217. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
218. 41 Fed. Reg. 55529 (1976).
219. Citizens in Long Beach, California, for example, unsuccessfully objected to an offset
on the ground that while it might improve air quality generally, it would worsen conditions in
the immediate area upwind of the source of the emissions that were to be reduced. See note
224 infra and accompanying text.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
221. See, e.g., text at notes 53-54, 62-65, 87-88, 96-102, & 121-22 supra.
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sources in the region,'' 222 and the EPA's guidelines explicitly allowed
offsets based on reductions from sources owned by others.223 The
logic of the guidelines is impeccable; as long as net emissions are
reduced it is immaterial who reduces them. In this way the statute
creates a market in emission rights, making private ingenuity work
toward improving the air. Thus our steelmaker, unwilling to retire
its own open-hearth furnaces, may be able to pay the owner of a
nearby foundry to close down a marginal furnace, to control it beyond plan requirements, or to move to another region. Such a contractual offset was recently reported on a large scale in Long Beach,
California: The state agency permitted a corporation to construct a
new marine terminal after it agreed to pay $78,000,000 to improve
emission control at a neighboring power plant and at a number of
dry-cleaning establishments.224
The pre-1977 EPA guidelines, however, expressly forbade "banking" of emission reductions for offset against future new sources:
"Once an emission offset has been executed for a particular new
source, there can be no left-over credit to 'bank' for additional new
source growth in the future." 225 Thus, if our steelmaker claimed
credit toward one new furnace when it closed an old mill last year, it
could not claim from that closing additional credit toward construction of another furnace this year even if last year's emission reductions were great enough to have justified three or four new furnaces.
The EPA's explanation was that offset banking "would be inconsistent with a basic policy of the Act and the ruling - namely, that
at a minimum, no new source should be allowed to make existing
[ambient] violations any worse.'' 226 But industry correctly pointed
out that the refusal to allow banking penalized conscientious owners
who had already installed the best emission controls, forcing them to
look elsewhere for offset credit while their dawdling competitors received credit for reductions they should have already achieved.
Moreover, the no-banking rule operated as an incentive to delay implementing additional control measures until the owner needed the
reduction to offset expansion. Persuaded by these arguments, the
EPA revised its interpretation after the adoption of the 1977 Amendments to allow banking of offset reductions, 227and it has incorpo222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

42 U.S.C. § 7503(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
41 Fed. Reg. 55530 (1976).
See 9 ENVJR. REP. (BNA) 691 (1978); 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2387 (1979).
41 Fed. Reg. 55529 (1976).
Id. at 55526.
44 Fed. Reg. 3285 (1979).
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rated that ruling in its guidelines for section 173.228
b.

The Alternative to Offset

Section 173(1)(B) allows the states an alternative to the case-bycase offset policy if their plans incorporate overall limits for newsource emissions that are counterbalanced by plan provisions that
will reduce existing emissions enough to make "reasonable further
progress" toward the ambient standard. 229 Unfortunately, the legislative history sheds little light on this vague provision. It first appeared in the House bill,230 but the House Report does not explain
its operation, saying only that it would allow "greater flexibility"
than the EPA's existing offset policy.231
While speculation is hazardous, another example may illustrate
the basic outline of what Congress had in mind. If a state must reduce existing emissions by 2000 tons per year to achieve ambient
standards, it may choose in its revised plan to allow an additional
1000 to be emitted by new sources if it adopts a plan provision requiring reductions totaling 3000 by the 1982 deadline, as long as
each intervening year brings a roughly proportional net reduction.
How the state distributes the burden of reductions is left largely to its
own judgment, subject to the overriding requirement of "reasonable
further progress."232 In short, like the other provisions of the 1977
Amendments, the nonattainment provisions exemplify the patchwork, crisis-responsive drafting that is characteristic of the Clean Air
Act.233
228. 44 Fed. Reg. 20380 (1979). The statutory offset language, governing new plans, requires a comparison of allowable emissions "at the time the new source is to commence operation" with those "prior to the application" for its construction. Banking is not specifically
addressed, and "prior to the application" could be taken to refer to any time before application, implying that banking is permissible. The Committee Reports are silent. Though the
most natural reading is that the relevant comparison is with emissions immediately prior to
application, the EPA's interpretation is certainly reasonable enough to be sustained under
Train v. National Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(B) (Supp. I 1977).
230. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 388 (1977).
231. Id. at 211, 213, reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1290, 1292.
232. The plan proposed by Illinois on April I, 1979, is suggestive. While Illinois intends to
rely principally upon case-by-case offsets, it has planned existing-source reductions sufficient
to cover a "growth allowance," which may be drawn upon by new sources unable to obtain
offsets. See (Draft) State Implementation Plan for the State of Illinois, vol. I, p. 5-4 (1979).
233. The problem of new sources is complicated by the existence of an entirely separate
permit system for major new sources in attainment areas, designed to prevent "significant deterioration" of areas now clean. Clean Air Act, Part C, Subpart I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479
(Supp. I 1977). Because an area may be designated as "attainment" for one pollutant and
"nonattainment" for another, a single source may require two permits under the same statute.
Moreover, there are numerous large and small differences in the provisions respecting the two
permit systems, including the definitions both of "major" sources and of the required control
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CONCLUSION

The bewildering menagerie of partial relief provisions in the 1977
Act promises to be a rich source of expensive and time-consuming
litigation. Moreover, while the amendments have avoided immediate
economic catastrophe by alleviating the most acute problems of prior
law, they provide only temporary symptomatic relief for the continuing malady of statutory inflexibility. By placing absolute deadlines
in the new DCO and nonattainment provisions, 234 for example, Congress virtually assured itself of facing the same problems again during the 1980s.
It is tempting to say that Congress has failed to learn from its
mistakes. Experience with the initial set of ambient standards has
shown the likelihood that the statutory schedule will be unrealistically tight in a number of cases. The obvious remedy, I have argued,
is a general provision allowing individual variances or categorical
relaxation of standards for unreasonable hardship. Yet Congress in
1977 not only failed to enact such a provision; it deliberately shut off
the general safety valve the EPA had discovered in the "reasonable
time" provision of section 113(a)(4).235 The stopper is section 1lO(h):
Except for a primary nonferrous smelter order under section 119 of this
title, a suspension under section llO(f) or (g) of this section (relating to
emergency suspensions), an exemption under section 118 of this title
(relating to certain Federal facilities), an order under section 113(d)
(relating to compliance orders), a plan promulgation under section
llO(c) of this section, or a plan revision under section 110(a)(3) of this
section, no order, suspension, plan revision, or other action modifying
any requirement of an applicable implementation plan may be taken
with respect to any stationary source by the State or by the Administrator.236

Despite the Senate Committee's blustering statement in 1970 that
"existing sources . . . should meet the standard of the law or be
closed down," 237 the relief granted in 1977 shows that massive closings were not what Congress had in mind. It seems much more
probable that Congress set absolute deadlines in order to create an
technology. It would have made more sense to require a single permit for major new sources
of regulated pollutants anywhere, making clear that the determination of technology and cost
could vary according to the need for control in the particular area, and requiring a showing
that the new source would neither contribute to significant deterioration of clean areas nor
impede reasonable progress toward attainment in dirty ones.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (Supp. I 1977) (delayed-compliance orders); 42 U.S.C. § 7502
(Supp. I 1977) (nonattainment areas).
235. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § I 13(a)(4) (repealed 1977). See text at note 19

supra.
236. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § l lO(h), 42 U.S.C. § 74IO(i) (Supp. I 1977).
237. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
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incentive for the development of new and better technology, reserving to itself the sole power to make adjustments in case good-faith
efforts failed to do the trick. This was the explanation for the rigid .
deadlines for motor-vehicle emissions in section 202(b), which Congress set with full knowledge that the technology was not yet available.238 Similarly, the Supreme Court has described the
implementation-plan provisions as "technology-forcing."239 And no
doubt Congress was right in perceiving that the desired incentive was
significantly enhanced by the fact that in order to relax the deadline,
industry had to persuade Congress itself, not simply the BPA, that it
had done all it could.240 Whether the additional incentive is great
enough to justify the costs of statutory complexity and continual
amendment is a question on which reasonable people may well disagree.
Whether Congress's aim was to force technology or to ignore the
price of absolute health protection, it may have overlooked a significant loophole. Section 1IO(h) prevents only the states and the Administrator from granting extensions not expressly authorized by
statute; it does not limit the traditional power of the courts to consider relative hardship in framing equitable decrees. 241 One district
court has already suggested that this authority survives the 1977
Amendments, ordering compliance with a plan requirement only
after finding that the necessary equipment was available at reason238. 42 U.S.C. § 752l(b) (Supp. I 1977). See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 27
(1970). Senator Muskie, sponsor of the vehicle provisions, made clear he anticipated amendment if the technology was not forthcoming. 116 CoNo. REC. 32,905 (1970). See generally
Currie, The Mobile-Source Provisions ofthe Clean Air Act, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 811 (1979).
239. Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976).
240. See Kramer, The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments: A Tactical Retreatfrom t/1e Technology-Forcing Strategy?, 15 URB. L. ANN. 103 (1978). Professor Kramer finds "an inflexible
attainment date" a "key ingredient" in a technology-forcing strategy. Accordingly, he views
the 1977 liberalization of the explicit variance provisions as a step backward and the rejection
of a general variance provision as the legislation's saving grace. Id. at 156-57. He does not
contend, however, that the relaxations were unnecessary to avoid unreasonable hardship, or
that industry has not made honest efforts to develop better technology. Extensions, if granted
only upon a showing of good faith, are not inconsistent with technology-forcing. See note 238
supra. And since the 1977 Amendments still contain absolute deadlines, even Professor
Kramer acknowledges that they "reflect more a mid-course correction for the technology-forcing strategy initially mandated in 1970 than a total rejection," Kramer, supra at 156.
241. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (cost of abating nuisance); Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protec•
tion Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (tempering with cost considerations the absolute
language of the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976), in formulating a remedy). For dicta suggesting that such considerations were relevant in framing judicial remedies under the implementation-plan provisions prior to 1977, see Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 509 F.2d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1975); Friends of the Earth v. PEPCO, 419 F.
Supp. 528, 535 (D.D.C. 1976). Contra, United States v. United States Steel Corp., 9 ENVIR,
REP. (BNA) 1002, 1005 (N.D. Ala. 1976). See Currie, Federal Air-Quality Standards and Their
Implementation, 1976 A.B.F. RES. J. 365, 405-06.
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able cost. 242
Thus if Congress really means to shut down noncomplying
sources without regard to hardship, it may have to say so more explicitly. It would be better, however, to replace the present procrustean structure with a single provision allowing variances for those
who in good faith cannot comply without unreasonable hardship.

242. See United States v. West Penn Power Co., 460 F. Supp. 1305, 1307-12, 1313-14
(W.D. Pa. 1978).

